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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
I.

INTRODUCTION

This criminal procedure survey covers cases appearing in the New
Mexico Bar Bulletin between August 1, 1989 and June 30, 1990. The

survey article is organized to follow the sequence of events in a criminal
proceeding. More specifically, this survey article addresses: (1) fourth
amendment suppression issues; (2) speedy trial; (3) assistance of counsel;
and (4) double jeopardy.
II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

-

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The fourth amendment protects "persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures."' As a preliminary matter,
a court must determine whether the questioned search and seizure was
the result of government conduct. The fourth amendment applies to
unreasonable searches and seizures by federal and state governments and
does not regulate conduct between individual citizens. 2 If government

conduct exists, the court must then examine whether the individual has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place(s) searched or the item(s)
seized.' If a reasonable expectation
of privacy exists, then fourth amend4
ment protection is implicated.
The court is faced with one of two situations if a fourth amendment
right exists: (1) searches conducted with warrants; and (2) searches con-

I.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id. The fourth amendment applies to the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
The New Mexico provision sets forth:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the
persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation.
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10.
2. See, e.g., State v. Johnston, 108 N.M. 778, 779 P.2d 556 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108
N.M. 771, 779 P.2d 549 (1989). In State v. Johnston, Johnston argued that a blood sample taken
by a hospital as part of his treatment could not be used against him in a criminal prosecution.
The court of appeals rejected Johnston's argument because the blood test was not taken by or at
the request of the state, and private blood tests taken solely at the request of a physician do not
implicate the fourth amendment. Id. at 780, 779 P.2d at 558 (citing State v. Richerson, 87 N.M.
437, 440, 535 P.2d 644, 647 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 450, 535 P.2d 657 (1975)).
3. If the person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, then there is no fourth
amendment protection and the analysis ends. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citations omitted).
4. Katz further held that what a person seeks to preserve as private may be constitutionally
protected, even in an area accessible to the public. Id. at 351-52.
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ducted without warrants. In cases where a search warrant was obtained,
the central issue involves the validity of the warrant. Two survey cases
involved the validity of a search warrant.5 Each of these cases involved
the issuance of a search warrant based on hearsay by an informant.
In those instances where a search warrant is invalid, or where no
search warrant was obtained, the fourth amendment analysis still considers
whether the search and seizure falls into one of the many exceptions to

the search warrant requirement. 6 During the survey period, four exceptions

to the search warrant requirement were addressed by New Mexico appellate
courts.'
A.

Search Warrants
The issuance of a valid search warrant requires that the issuance of

the warrant be based on probable cause.' Moreover, the warrant must

be issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate." 9 In the cases considered
by the New Mexico appellate courts, the issue centered around whether
hearsay information obtained from informants gave probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant. The United States Supreme Court has
faced this problem on a number of occasions, and thus has developed
the test to be applied under the fourth amendment by the federal courts,

which is set forth in Illinois v. Gates.'0 States, however, have a choice

between following the federal standard or applying their own state con-

stitutional standard." During the survey period, New Mexico made its
choice. 12

1. The Federal Standard
The federal standard involved a trilogy of cases. 3 The first test de5
veloped under the federal standard involved two cases.' 4 Aguilar v. Texas
5. State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989); State v. Therrien, 110 N.M. 261, 794
P.2d 735 (Ct. App. 1990).
6. "Generally, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, unless it falls within an exception
to the search warrant requirement." State v. Corneau, 109 N.M. 81, 89, 781 P.2d 1159, 1167 (Ct.
App. 1989) (citing State v. Crenshaw, 105 N.M. 329, 732 P.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1986)).
7. New Mexico appellate courts adressed: the automobile exception (State v. Pena, 108 N.M.
760, 779 P.2d 538 (1989)); the canine exception (State v. Villanueva, 110 N.M. 359, 796 P.2d 252
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 260, 794 P.2d 734 (1990)); the plain view doctrine (State v.
Lopez, 109 N.M. 169, 783 P.2d 479 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 109 N.M. 131, 782 P.2d 384 (1989);
State v. Zelinske, 108 N.M. 784, 779 P.2d 971 (Ct. App. 1989)); and the inevitable discovery
doctrine (State v. Corneau, 109 N.M. 81, 781 P.2d 1159 (Ct. App. 1989)). Other exceptions to the
warrant requirement include exigent circumstances, searches incident to arrest, inventory searches,
consent, and hot pursuit. See State v. Crenshaw, 105 N.M. 329, 333, 732 P.2d 431, 435 (Ct. App.
1986).
8. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933).
9. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
10. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
11. N.M. R. CRIM. P. 17(f) (1953 & Supp. 1975); see also Hudson v. State, 89 N.M. 759, 557
P.2d 1108 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
12. State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989).
13. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
14. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
15. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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set forth the standard under which search warrants could be issued based
on the knowledge of an informer. Aguilar held that an affidavit may
be based on hearsay information, provided that the magistrate is informed
of "some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant ... was 'credible' or his information 'relia-

ble.""'1 6 This initial requirement has been referred to as the "adequacy
of the informant's basis of knowledge' '1 7 prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli
test.
In addition, Spinelli v. United States 8 held that if the magistrate is
not furnished with information stating how the information was gathered,
the tip must "describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail
that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more
substantial than a casual rumor. . ."
". This second requirement has been

referred to as the "veracity of the informant" 20 prong of the AguilarSpinelli test.
After the decision in Spinelli, the question of the issuance of a search
warrant based on the hearsay evidence of an informant was settled. In
1983, however, the United States Supreme Court rejected the AguilarSpinelli test and announced a new standard in Illinois v. Gates.21 Gates
modified the two-part requirement to a mere "totality of the circumstances" test. 22 Under the current federal standard, the two-pronged
Aguilar-Spinelli test has been abandoned in favor of a less definite
standard where the magistrate merely examines the "totality of the circumstances" to 23determine if probable cause exists for the issuance of a
search warrant.
In adopting the totality of the circumstances test, the Court stated
that it was "far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable
cause than is any rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every
informant's tip.''24 The Court believed that the Aguilar-Spinelli test was
too inflexible and technical. 25 The totality of the circumstances test, on
the other hand, was flexible and able to take into account many of the
events of everyday life.26
2. The New Mexico Standard
Despite the federal modification leading to the adoption of the totality
of the circumstances test, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided, in

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 114 (footnote omitted).
State v. Therrien, 110 N.M. 261, 262, 794 P.2d 735, 736 (Ct. App. 1990).
393 U.S. 410 (1969).
Id. at 416.
Therrien, 110 N.M. at 262, 794 P.2d at 736.
462 U.S. 213, 244-45 (1983).
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
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State v. Cordova,27 to continue to follow the Aguilar-Spinelli test first
adopted by New Mexico in 1975 .21 If states were required to apply the
same standards as the federal courts, no debate would exist. The federal
standard, however, serves only as a bare minimum. States are free to
impose higher standards in search and seizure cases than mandated under
the United States Constitution.29 When a state chooses to give greater
protection than that given in the federal constitution, it is usually accomplished by interpreting greater protection under a state's constitution
or statutes.
In Cordova, the police received a tip from an informant that Cordova
was selling heroin out of a private residence.3 0 The informant stated that
Cordova was driving a red Chrysler Cordova with Texas plates. The
informant also gave the address of the residence." Additionally, the
informant gave the police a description of Cordova and stated that several
2
heroin users had been observed at the house.3 Police drove by the
33
residence and verified the physical description given by the informant.
An affidavit was prepared by the police, and the magistrate issued a
search warrant.3 4 Cordova was arrested and convicted of3 5possession of
heroin after the trial court denied a motion to suppress.
Cordova appealed on the issue of whether sufficient probable cause
36
existed for the magistrate to issue the search warrant. The court of
37
appeals applied the Aguilar-Spinelli test that is codified in rule 5-21 I(E)
and reversed the trial court because the affadavit on which the warrant
was based was inadequate.3 8 The supreme court granted certiorari and
upheld the court of appeals, finding that the entire affidavit was comprised39
of hearsay information and "stated no more than . . .innocent facts."

27. 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989).

28. N.M. R. Cium. P. 17(f) (1953 & Supp. 1975); see also Hudson v. State, 89 N.M. 759, 557
P.2d 1108 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).

29. "Our holding, of course, does not affect the State's power to impose higher standards on
searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so." Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
30. 109 N.M. at 212, 784 P.2d at 31.

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-211(E). This rule provides:
As used in this rule, "probable cause" shall be based upon substantial evidence,
which may be hearsay in whole or in part, provided there is a substantial basis
for believing the source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there
is a factual basis for the information furnished. Before ruling on a request for a
warrant the court may require the affiant to appear personally and may examine
under oath the affiant and any witnesses he may produce, provided that such
additional evidence shall be reduced to writing, supported by oath or affirmation
and served with the warrant.
Id.; see also N.M. R. Canm. P. 7-208(E), 8-208(F); Cordova, 109 N.M. at 214 & n.4, 784 P.2d at
33 & n.4.
38. Cordova, 109 N.M. at 212, 784 P.2d at 31.
39. Id. at 218, 784 P.2d at 37.
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These facts, either separately or as a whole, did not suggest illegal
activity .40
Although Cordova's appeal was based on both the federal and state
constitutions, the court based its decision on the New Mexico Constitution4
and court rules. The court did find the federal precedent informative. '
The court noted that although it did not consider Illinois v. Gates and
be controlling, this line of cases was considered
the cases cited therein to
42
in making its decision.

In retaining the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the supreme court held that the
principles of the New Mexico Constitution were better served by this
test. 43 Despite this fact, the court stated that if, in the future, the Illinois
v. Gates test better serves the principles of the New Mexico Constitution,
it will be adopted. The supreme court found that the United States
Supreme Court adopted the Illinois v. Gates test because the lower courts
were applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test "in too rigid and technical a
fashion.""
In State v. Therrien,45 an affidavit was issued based upon information
supplied by an unidentified informant. The police received a crime stopper's call stating that Therrien was growing marijuana. The informant
also provided the police with Therrien's location. 46 Police drove by the
47
address and saw a house with a small shed, a car, and a pickup truck.
The caller also told police that the marijuana would be harvested and
moved before the next day. 48 This anonymous telephone information was

put into an affidavit. 49 Based on this affidavit, the magistrate issued a
search warrant.5 0
Therrien was arrested and convicted of possession of more that eight
ounces of marijuana.' Therrien appealed from his conviction on the
grounds that the affidavit was insufficient for the issuance of the search
warrant.12 The New Mexico Court of Appeals relied on State v. Cordova"
and applied the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test. In Therrien, the court
of appeals held that the search warrant was 4based on an affidavit that
did not pass the veracity prong of the test.1

40. Id. (citing Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416).
41. Id. at 212 n.l, 784 P.2d at 31 n.1.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 217, 784 P.2d at 36 (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 216, 784 P.2d at 35.
45. 110 N.M. 261, 794 P.2d 735 (Ct. App. 1990).
46. Id. at 262, 794 P.2d at 736. "Crime stoppers" may give police tips as to illegal activities
without having to identify themselves. Further, if the tipleads to favorable results, the caller receives
a cash award. Id. at 264, 794 P.2d at 738.
47. Id. at 262, 794 P.2d at 736. The location and vehicles matched the description given by
the caller. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 261, 794 P.2d at 735.
52. Id.
53. 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989); see supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
54. 110 N.M. at 263, 794 P.2d at 737.
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To pass the veracity prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, information by

unidentified informants must include information corroborating the tip."
The fact that a crime stopper informant would receive a financial reward,
in and of itself, is not sufficient to fulfill the veracity prong of the test.56

Further, information supplied by unknown informants must be accepted
with greater caution than information received from a known informant
because the basis of the unknown informant's knowledge is unknown

and cannot be ascertained." Finally, it is impossible to determine whether
a crime stopper's information is based upon personal knowledge or

rumor. 58 As a result, the information in the crime stopper's call was
insufficient to pass the veracity-prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
B.

Warrantless Searches and Seizures

Often, circumstances require police to make a search without a warrant.
When making a warrantless search, probable cause must exist for the
search to be valid. The United States Supreme Court has held that the
probable cause requirement cannot be less for a warrantless search than
that required for the issuance of a valid search warrant. 59
Further, warrantless searches are assumed to be invalid.60 As held in

State v. Pena,6' "it has long been the rule that warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution." 62 Nevertheless, exceptions to this rule exist. During the
survey period, New Mexico courts had ample opportunity 63to examine
several of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement.

1. Consent to Search
In State v. Zelinske,6 the court of appeals addressed whether police
had probable cause to arrest Zelinske and seize the automobile he was
driving without a warrant. In this case, the police stopped Zelinske at

a valid roadblock. 6 Zelinske produced a valid driver's license along with

55. Id. at 262, 794 P.2d at 736.
56. Id. at 264, 794 P.2d at 738.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
60. State v. Pena, 108 N.M. 760, 761, 779 P.2d 538, 539 (1989). As a result, the burden of
proof will be on the state to show that the warrantless search was reasonable and fell within one
of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement.
61. Id. at 761, 779 P.2d at 539.
62. 108 N.M. 760, 779 P.2d 538 (1989); see infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
63. The New Mexico appellate courts addressed: the automobile exception (State v. Pena, 108
N.M. 760, 779 P.2d 538 (1989)); the canine exception (State v. Villanueva, 110 N.M. 359, 796 P.2d
252 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 260, 794 P.2d 734 (1990)); the plain view doctrine (State
v. Lopez, 109 N.M. 169, 783 P.2d 479 (1989); State v. Zelinske, 108 N.M. 784, 779 P.2d 971 (Ct.
App. 1989)); consent to search (State v. Zelinske, 108 N.M. 784, 779 P.2d 971 (Ct. App. 1989));
and the inevitable discovery doctrine (State v. Corneau, 109 N.M. 81, 781 P.2d 1159 (Ct. App.
1989)).
64. 108 N.M. 784, 779 P.2d 971 (Ct. App. 1989).
65. Id. at 785, 779 P.2d at 972.
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the rental agreement for the car. 6 The police requested permission to
search the car after detecting a deodorizing agent. 67 Zelinske gave the
police permission to search the car. 68 As police searched the trunk of
the car, they saw a heavily-taped box in a garment bag. 69 The officer
touched the box.70 At this point, Zelinske withdrew his consent to the
search, placed the box back into the garment bag, and closed the trunk
of the car.7" The police seized Zelinske and the car.7 2 Zelinske was arrested,73
the officer swore out an affidavit, and a search warrant was issued.
The police found cocaine in the taped box. Zelinske 74
was charged with
attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
The trial court denied Zelinske's motion to suppress the evidence.
Zelinske then entered a plea of no contest. 75 Zelinske appealed from the
order denying his motion to suppress.76 On appeal, Zelinske argued that
there were no grounds for the issuance of the search warrant. 77 The
incriminating evidence was found only after the defendant had withdrawn
his consent to the search. The court of appeals conceded the legality of
the initial stop and focused on the "crucial" issue of whether probable
7
cause existed at the moment Zelinske withdrew his consent. 1
It is well established that a search warrant must be based on the
information that is known by the police at the time the search warrant
is sought.7 9 The court found that by withdrawing his consent to the
search, Zelinske exhibited the required expectation of privacy to invoke
his fourth amendment rights.8 0 As a result, probable cause had to be
based on the information that was known by police at the time consent
was withdrawn by Zelinske. s ' The officers knew of the presence of the
deodorizer and the taped cardboard box at the time consent was withdrawn
by Zelinske.12 The court of appeals held that this was not enough. "The
use of neither a deodorizer nor a taped cardboard box, however, can
be considered ' unusual
or even uniquely suited to use in the transportation
83
of narcotics.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 784, 779 P.2d at 971.
75. Id. at 784-85, 779 P.2d 971-72.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 785, 779 P.2d at 972.
78. Id. at 785-86, 779 P.2d at 972-73.
79. Id. at 786, 779 P.2d at 973.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing State v. Blea, 88 N.M. 538, 543 P.2d 831 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 5,
546 P.2d 70 (1975)).
82. Id.
83. Id.at 787, 779 P.2d at 974 (citing State v. Galvan, 90 N.M. 129, 560 P.2d 550 (Ct. App.
1977)); see also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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Finally, the state contended that the presence of the deodorizer and
the heavily-taped box, coupled with Zelinske's withdrawal of consent to
the search, gave the police probable cause for the warrantless seizure.
The court of appeals rejected this argument and held that the withdrawal
of consent could not be used by police to conduct a warrantless search.'
Judge Alarid found justification for the court's decision. If the refusal
or withdrawal of consent to a search gave probable cause for a search,
then police would be able to conduct the search no matter what response
was given once they requested permission to search someone suspected
of unlawful conduct8 5 Moreover, if the person consented to the search,
police would be allowed to conduct the search.16 But, if the person did
not consent to the search, police would still be allowed to conduct the
search because probable cause would then exist for the issuance of a
search warrant.8 7 Therefore, police would be allowed to conduct a search
whether consent was obtained or not.8 8 The court of appeals found that
this result conflicted with the probable cause requirement of the fourth
amendment. 89
2. Automobile Exception
The mobility of automobiles presents unique problems under the fourth
amendment. If an officer was required to obtain a search warrant prior
to searching a car, the opportunity would usually be lost because the
car would be moved before the officer could return with the warrant2 0
As a result, the courts have permitted warrantless searches of automobiles
since the early part of this century. 9' The courts have continued to make
exceptions to the search warrant requirement for automobiles because
the opportunity to search it is soon lost. 92 All that is required for a valid
without a warrant is that the police have probable
search of an automobile
93
cause for the search.
The automobile exception to the search warrant requirement arises
when police officers have probable cause to believe that contraband is
94
present in a stopped car on the side of the road or at a roadblock.
In State v. Pena, police stopped Pena's car at a roadblock. 95 At the
96
request of the police, Pena allowed the car's ashtray to be searched.

84. Id. at 788, 779 P.2d at 975. Probable cause requirements for warrantless searches are at
least as stringent as those to obtain a valid search warrant. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 479 (1963).
85. Zelinski, 108 N.M. at 788, 779 P.2d at 975.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 n.9 (1970).
See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
Id. at 49; see also State v. Barton, 92 N.M. 118, 120, 584 P.2d 165, 167 (Ct. App. 1978).
State v. Pena, 108 N.M. 760, 761, 779 P.2d 538, 539 (1989).
Id. at 760, 779 P.2d at 538.

96. Id.
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Police found an alligator roach clip in the ashtray. 7 The residue on the
roach clip tested positive for marijuana in a field test performed at the
location where the police had stopped Pena.98
Because the roach clip contained marijuana residue, the police made
a warrantless search of Pena's car over his objection." As a result of
the search of the car and a pat-down search of Pena, police found a
significant amount of cocaine and cash, as well as drug paraphernalia. °0
The trial court denied Pena's motion to suppress the evidence found as
a result of the warrantless search by police.' 0 ' After a bench trial, Pena
was convicted of trafficking cocaine with the intent to distribute and
possession of drug paraphernalia. 3 2
Prior to this case, New Mexico appellate courts had not faced this
03
issue. The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed Pena's convictions
4
based on People v. Franklin.10 In Franklin, the police arrested Franklin,
after conducting a warrantless search, based on the observation of a
roach clip on a key ring. 05 A charred residue was present on the roach
clip, but police found no narcotics on the end of the roach clip.'06
Franklin held that the observation by police of a roach clip with charred
residue containing no narcotic materials was not sufficient to establish
the probable cause required to search the automobile without a warrant. 07
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the discovery of a roach clip and marijuana residue alone gave police
probable cause to search Pena's car. 08 In reversing the court of appeals,
the supreme court found that probable cause for a warrantless search
existed under the automobile exception."°
In general, the automobile exception, which allows the search of a
car, arises when police have probable cause to believe there is contraband
in a vehicle stopped on the road."10 The court held that the narcotic
material found on the roach clip tied it to an illegal use and resulted
in the required probable cause to support the warrantless search."' The
fact that the roach clip in Pena's case contained narcotic material on it
distinguished the warrantless search from the search conducted in People
v. Franklin.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. An inventory of the car revealed 26 one-gram packets of cocaine. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 761, 779 P.2d at 539.
104. 46 A.D.2d 189, 362 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1974).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 190, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
107. Id.
108. Pena, 108 N.M. at 760, 779 P.2d at 538.
109. Id. at 761, 779 P.2d at 539. It should be noted that the majority consisted of three justices,
with one additional justice writing a concurring opinion and the final justice adopting the opinion
of the majority of the court of appeals as his dissent.
110. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 550 (10th Cir. 1985)).
111. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

Once contraband, such as marijuana, is legally observed within a car,
police have probable cause to believe that other contraband may be in
the car. 1 2 As a result, police may search the car under the automobile
exception to the search warrant requirement." 3 Thus, the police validly
searched Pena's car and the trial court properly admitted the evidence.
3. Canine Sniff Searches
Canine sniff searches of luggage at airports and bus stations have been
held permissible under the fourth amendment by the United States Supreme Court. 1 4 In upholding the use of trained dogs to detect narcotics
in a traveler's luggage, the Court has found that the sniff only indicates
the presence or absence of narcotics." 5 No other information as to the
contents of the person's luggage is revealed." 6 As a result, the Court
has determined that the use of trained dogs does not constitute a search
under the fourth amendment."'
Only one New Mexico case, State v. Sandoval,"' has addressed whether
detection of the odor of narcotics provides sufficient probable cause to
conduct a search. Sandoval involved a case of human detection of narcotic
odors. In Sandoval, agents smelled raw marijuana in a car they had
stopped at a citizenship checkpoint." 9 The agents recovered five plastic
bags containing ten pounds of marijuana. 20 The defendants were convicted
of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute and of conspiring
to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute. 12 Defendants appealed,
asserting, inter alia, that the search was invalid because the agents did
not have probable cause, and the agents were not qualified to detect the
22
odor of marijuana.1
In Sandoval, the court found that the odor of marijuana was sufficient
to give probable cause for a search of the car. 2a Further, an agent's
testimony that he smelled raw marijuana was sufficient to establish that
the agent was familiar with the odor. 24
In State v. Villanueva, 25 the court considered whether detection of an
odor by a trained dog at a border checkpoint constituted an illegal search.
Villanueva presented an issue of first impression in New Mexico. In this

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 762, 779 P.2d at 540.
Id. at 761, 779 P.2d at 539.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
Id.
Id.
Id.
92 N.M. 476, 590 P.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1979).
Id. at 477, 590 P.2d at 176.
Id.at 479, 590 P.2d at 178.
Id. at 477, 590 P.2d at 176.
Id. at 477-78, 590 P.2d at 176-77.
Id. at 478, 590 P.2d at 177.
Id.
110 N.M. 359, 796 P.2d 252 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 260, 794 P.2d 734 (1990).
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case, the border patrol 2 6 stopped a commercial bus from El Paso, Texas
containing Villanueva and several other passengers.' 27 After checking the
citizenship of the passengers, the border patrol agents obtained permission
from the driver to open the luggage compartments. 28 Narcotic detection
dogs reacted positively to two suitcases. 129 The driver indicated that these
130
two suitcases and one other suitcase belonged to Villanueva.
After Villaneuva denied having any luggage on the bus, the agents
3
asked him to go inside the checkpoint office for further questioning.' '
3
2
Inside, Villanueva again denied having any luggage on the bus.' The
33
agents asked Villanueva to empty his pockets and take off his shoes.
The agents found baggage 34claim receipts for the three pieces of luggage
in Villanueva's right shoe.
The agents summoned the state police, who gave Villanueva his Miranda
rights. 135 The agents opened the suitcases without a warrant, and police
found approximately forty pounds of marijuana. 3 6 Villanueva claimed
that the use of the trained drug detection dogs by the agents 37violated
his fourth amendment rights and constituted an illegal search.
Villanueva filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result
The trial court admitted the maof and following the canine search.'
rijuana found in the suitcases, but ordered that the baggage claim tickets
39 Both the
and the oral statements made by Villanueva be suppressed.
state and Villanueva filed for an interlocutory appeal from the trial court
order. "4
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court and adopted the United
States Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Place,"4' finding that
the canine search did not result in an illegal search. Although Villanueva
expands the use of odors to establish probable cause to include those

126. New Mexico, as one of the states that borders a foreign country, maintains permanent
checkpoints at its borders.
[Tihe Border Patrol [may] maintain permanent checkpoints at or near intersections
of important roads leading away from the border at which a vehicle would be
stopped for brief questioning of its occupants "even though there is no reason to
believe that a particular vehicle contains illegal aliens."
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 587 (1983) (quoting United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976)).
127. Villanueva, 110 N.M. at 360, 796 P.2d at 253.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 361, 796 P.2d at 254.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 360, 796 P.2d at 253. The state appealed only as to the suppression of the baggage
claim tickets. Id. at 361, 796 P.2d at 254.
141. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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detected by trained dogs in public places, 42 the use of this holding in
future cases is limited. The court was careful to stress that its holding
was limited to searches conducted at border patrol checkpoints, luggage
in a common area, and when the owner is at some distance from the
luggage. 43 The court reserved expanding its holding beyond the facts in
this case until such a case is properly presented to it.'"
4. Plain View Doctrine
The requirements of a valid search and seizure under the plain view
doctrine were set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge
v. New Hampshire. 45 The Coolidge decision held'" that valid searches
and seizures under the plain view doctrine require that: (1) the item be
in plain view; (2) the police be lawfully in the position to observe the
item; (3) the incriminating nature of the item be immediately apparent;
and (4) the item have been inadvertently discovered. 47 As of June 1990,
4
forty-six states had adopted the requirements set forth in Coolidge. 8
49
New Mexico adopted these requirements in State v. Luna.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals dealt with two cases involving the
plain view doctrine during the survey period. 5 0 In State v. Lopez,'5' the
defendant, Lopez, was parked in a pickup on a dead-end street with a
passenger, Sanchez, in his vehicle. 5 2 A van pulled up and parked approximately one car length away from the pickup.' Four police officers
got out of the van and approached the pickup.' 54 While standing next
to the pickup, one of the officers went to the passenger side of the
pickup and noticed contraband inside on the seat of the pickup.," The
issue raised in this case was whether the conduct of the police officers

142. Villaneuva, 110 N.M. at 362, 796 P.2d at 255.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
146. The Supreme Court has since stated that "Justice Stewart's analysis of the 'plain view'
doctrine did not command a majority and a plurality of the Court has since made clear that the
discussion [of Coolidge v. New Hampshsire] is 'not a binding precedent."' Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128,
-,
110 S. Ct. 2301, 2307 (1990) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737
(1983)).
147. State v. Luna, 93 N.M. 773, 779, 606 P.2d 183, 189 (1980).
148. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,
-,
110 S. Ct. 2301, 2312 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
149. Luna, 93 N.M. at 779, 606 P.2d at 189.
150. See State v. Lopez, 109 N.M. 169, 783 P.2d 479 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 109 N.M. 131,
782 P.2d 384 (1989); State v. Zelinske, 108 N.M. 784, 779 P.2d 971 (Ct. App. 1989). In Zelinske,
the court of appeals rejected the argument that a box that was heavily taped could be seized under
the plain view doctrine because its contents were not known to be contraband. Unless the container
itself is contraband, when the contents are unknown, the plain view exception to the search warrant
requirement does not apply. Id. at 787, 779 P.2d at 974.
151. 109 N.M. 169, 783 P.2d 479 (Ct. App), cert. quashed, 109 N.M. 131, 782 P.2d 384 (1989).
152. Id. at 171, 783 P.2d at 481.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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was such that Lopez would believe that he was being restrained by the
police prior to the discovery of the contraband in plain view.
The trial court found that Lopez had been illegally seized by police
and that, as a result, the police were not legally in a position to observe
the contraband in the car. 16 As a result, the trial court suppressed the
contraband discovered by the police. 5 7 In affirming the trial court, the
court of appeals found that based on the facts of this case, the trial
court could have found that Lopez believed that he was not free to
leave. 58 An officer may question a citizen so long as the officer does
not restrain the citizen without consent.' 59 The court of appeals found
that the trial court could correctly find that the officers illegally restrained
Lopez without his consent.
An important point is that, as with all cases since State v. Luna, the
requirements set forth in Coolidge v. New Hampshire were not questioned
by New Mexico courts. 60 On June 5, 1990, the United States Supreme
Court decided Horton v. California.'6' In its decision, the court rejected
the inadvertency requirement stated in Coolidge, and kept all the other
requirements for a valid plain view doctrine search and seizure. 162 In so
doing, the Court stated that "evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved
by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards
that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.''163 Thus,
the United States Supreme Court requires only that (1) the item be in
plain view, (2) the police be lawfully in the position to observe the item,
and (3) the incriminating nature of the item be immediately apparent. 64
State v. Lopez was decided after Horton v. California, and did not
present a proper forum for deciding New Mexico's response to Horton.
Basically, New Mexico may follow the decision in Horton and delete the
inadvertency requirement as previously required, 65 or it may retain the
additional requirement by relying on state constitutional law.'6 This will
be a future challenge for New Mexico courts.
5. "Fruits of the Poisonous Tree" Doctrine
The "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine can be traced back to
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States. 67 In Silverthorne, the Court

156. Id. at 170, 783 P.2d at 480.
157. Id.

158. Id. at 172, 783 P.2d at 482.
159. Id.

160. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Zelinske court also did not question the requirements set forth
in Coolidge.
161. 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).

162. Id. at

,

110 S. Ct. at 2308-09.

163. Id.
, 110 S. Ct. at 2308.
164. Id.at
165. See State v. Luna, 53 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183 (1980).

166. As noted supra, State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989), retained the Aguilar-

Spinelli test and rejected the Illinois v. Gates test. For a discussion of State v. Cordova, see notes
27-44 and accompanying text.
167. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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invalidated a subpoena issued based on information obtained from an
illegal search.' 68 Since the Silverthorne decision, a series of cases were
decided that evolved into the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
The underlying purpose of this doctrine is to prevent the use of evidence
illegally obtained by police. 69 The goal of the doctrine is to deter police
from making illegal searches.' 7 0
a. Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
Since its introduction, courts have also recognized the need to allow
some very important exceptions to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
One exception to the doctrine is the inevitable discovery exception. Under
the inevitable discovery exception, if the evidence that was illegally obtained would have been discovered in a legal manner anyway, the evidence
is admissible.' 7' The rationale for the inevitable discovery doctrine is
,grounded in the idea of deterrence. When misconduct on the part of
police resilts in evidence that would not otherwise have been obtained,
that evidence must be suppressed. 172 But, if the misconduct on the part
of police only results in evidence that would have been obtained lawfully
anyway, the police should not be penalized. 73
In State v. Barry, 74 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that, for
the inevitable discovery exception to apply, the prosecution must prove
that the police acted in good faith when the illegal search and seizure
was made and the evidence would have inevitably been discovered using
legal means.17 In 1984, the United States Supreme Court decided Nix
v. Williams,176 which "apparently removed the good faith requirement."177
For the first time since Nix, a New Mexico court was given the opportunity
to re-examine its good faith requirement when it decided State v. 'Corneau.
In Corneau,171.the police made three warrantless searches of Corneau's
apartment after his arrest for criminal sexual penetration and false imprisonment. Corneau moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result
of the second and third warrantless searches. 7 9 The court of appeals
found that the second and third searches made by the police could not
be justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement. 180

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
(1988).
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 392.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984).
Id. at 448.
Id. at 442-43.
United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 740 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233
94 N.M. 788, 617 P.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1980).
Id. at 790, 617 P.2d at 875.
467 U.S. 431 (1984).
State v. Corneau, 109 N.M. 81, 90, 781 P.2d 1159, 1168 (Ct. App. 1989).
109 N.M. 81, 781 P.2d 1159 (Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 89, 781 P.2d at 1167.
Id. at 89-90, 781 P.2d at 1167-68.
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In affirming the court's admission of the evidence seized during the
second and third warrantless searches, the court of appeals applied the
inevitable discovery exception. 8 ' The court held that since the victim
informed the police of the existence and location of the evidence, probable
cause existed for a search warrant (which was later obtained) and the
evidence would have inevitably been discovered.' 82
Next, the court examined the good faith requirement it had previously
announced in State v. Barry. Corneau's only claim of bad faith was that
the search was based on the district attorney's judgment and not a neutral
magistrate's judgment. 83 The court did not find that this represented bad
faith on the part of the officers.'1 Thus, the evidence seized by the
police during the second and third warrantless searches was held admissible.' 85
Ultimately, the court declined to rule on the good faith requirement.
While the court recognized that a law enforcement officer's conduct may
involve actual bad faith in some cases, there was no bad faith in this
case. With this in mind, the court left the question of the good faith
test required under State v. Barry, and removed in Nix v. Williams, for
86 Although the issue
decision when properly brought before the court.
remains undecided, some indication of the court's stance may be inferred
from the fact that the court declined to follow several other jurisdictions
that require the police possess and pursue lawful means prior to the
illegal conduct. 87 The court, however, reiterated the fact-specific nature
the important issue of the validity
of these cases and declined to answer
8
of the State v. Barry decision.
b. Limits of the "Fruits of the Poisonous Tree" Doctrine
A second limitation to the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine is that
18 9
The
not all evidence illegally obtained by the police must be excluded.
fruits
the
Supreme Court's decision in Wong Sun v. United States makes
of the poisonous tree doctrine a balancing test instead of a "but for"
test.' 90 A court must balance the interests of society in convicting the
wrongdoer with the deterrent function served by the fruits of the poisonous
tree doctrine.' 9'

181. Id. at 90, 781 P.2d at 1168.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 91, 781 P.2d at 1169. Prior to the second warrantless entry, as required under
departmental policy, the police telephoned an assistant district attorney. The assistant district attorney
gave police permission to make the warrantless entry. Id. at 85, 781 P.2d at 1163.
184. Id. at 91, 781 P.2d at 1169.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. Corneau did not raise this issue on appeal; therefore, it was not considered by the court.
189. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
190. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
191. Id. at 608-09 (Powell, J., concurring).
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In the highly publicized case of State v. Chamberlain, 92 the court of
appeals was presented with an illegal search issue. Officers Carrillo and
Messimer responded to a call at the Chamberlain residence. The call had
been made by a prostitute who had locked herself in the bathroom after
Chamberlain battered her. 93 When Carrillo and Messimer arrived, Chamberlain was at home alone.' 94 Chamberlain invited the officers to take
a look around the house. 195
At this point, Carrillo activated a portable tape recorder on his gun
belt. 96 The officers found a woman's comb on a bed and began to
question Chamberlain about it. 91 Chamberlain refused to answer any
questions and requested that the officers leave. 98 The officers refused to
leave. 199 A gun battle between Chamberlain and the officers followed,
resulting in Carrillo's death. 2°°
Chamberlain moved to suppress the tape recording from the point in
time when he requested the officers to leave. Chamberlain based this
motion on his assertion that the search from that point forward was
illegal because he had withdrawn his consent. 20 1
In affirming the trial court's admission of the evidence, the court of
appeals skirted the issue of whether the search was illegal. 202 The court
focused on the admissibility of a crime committed on a police officer,
rather than the legality of the search. 20 3 When framed in this manner,
the court refused to suppress the evidence, for '[application of the
exclusionary rule in such a fashion would in effect give the victims of
illegal searches a license to assault and murder the officers involved .... ,,,204 This result would be "manifestly unacceptable." 20 The
rationale for this decision is that an alleged victim of an illegal search
should seek protection through the court system by the exclusion of any
evidence illegally obtained by police, not through the assault and murder
of the officers.
III.

SIXTH AMENDMENT - SPEEDY TRIAL AND
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth in
pertinent part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

109 N.M. 173, 783 P.2d 483 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 154, 782 P.2d 1351 (1989).

Id.at 174, 783 P.2d at 484.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175, 783 P.2d at 485.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 641, 194 S.E.2d 353, 358 (1973)).
Id.
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the right to a speedy and public trial . . . and . .. have the Assistance

of Counsel for his defense." ' During the current survey period, New
Mexico courts ruled on both speedy trial issues and claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

Right to Speedy Trial
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth amendment of
the United States Constitution and made applicable to the states through

A.

the fourteenth amendment. 207 The right can also be asserted under state
speedy trial statutes. 208 The exclusive remedy for a violation of2 9the defendant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is dismissal. 0
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the defendant's
210
interest in safeguarding a speedy trial right in United States v. Ewell.
The Supreme Court provided its most extensive treatment of the sixth
21
amendment speedy trial right in Barker v. Wingo. 1 In Barker, the Court

applied a four factor balancing test to determine whether the defendant's

speedy trial right had been violated.2 12 The Barker factors are the length
of delay, the reason for delay, the assertion of the right to a speedy
213 These
trial, and the prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay.

factors are weighed against one another, and no single factor by itself
is determinative to finding a speedy trial violation. 2 4 On appeal, courts

the facts of the case and independently balance the Barker
must review
21
factors.

1

New Mexico courts gave express recognition to the Barker test and
began applying it in State v. Harvey.1 6 New Mexico courts217 also analyzed
speedy trial claims under the state's speedy trial statute.
1. Right to Speedy Trial - Constitutional Claims
Beginning with Harvey, New Mexico courts have applied the four
factors set forth in Barker to determine whether a defendant's consti-

206. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
207. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
208. The New Mexico speedy trial statute can be found at N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-604(B).
209. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973). "In light of the policies which underlie
the right to a speedy trial, dismissal must remain . .. 'the only possible remedy."' Id. (quoting
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972)).
210. 383 U.S. 116 (1966). The sixth amendment guarantee "is an important safeguard to prevent
undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying
public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused
to defend himself." Id. at 120; see infra notes 218-346 and accompanying text.
211. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
212. Id.at 530.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 533. The Barker Court found that "these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts
must ... engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process." Id.
215. State v. Grissom, 106 N.M. 555, 561, 746 P.2d 661, 667 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing United
States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986)).
216. 85 N.M. 214, 216, 510 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 1973).
217. See N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-604(B).
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tutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. 21 During the current
survey period, New Mexico courts used three cases to clarify and redefine the application of the Barker test to constitutionally-based speedy
21 9
trial claims.

In Zurla v. State, 220 the New Mexico Supreme Court emphasized the
relative importance of the first three Barker factors and clarified which
party bears the burden of proof regarding the fourth factor, prejudice
to the defendant. Zurla was arrested for shoplifting on December 14,
1985, while on parole for a prior conviction. 22' He was released the

following day after posting a $2,500 bond. 222 In late January, Zurla's
parole was revoked, in part, because of the pending charges against
him. 223 Due to his parole violation, Zurla was incarcerated from January
27, 1986, to May 22, 1987.224 There was a seventeen-month lapse between
Zurla's arrest and his trial date. 225 Upon returning to prison, Zurla filed
a pro se motion to have his trial set within six months. 226 Zurla was in
the custody of the Department of Corrections for most of the seventeen227
month delay due to his parole violation.

Despite Zurla's motion for a speedy trial, the district attorney's office

failed to inquire into his whereabouts. 22

A simple phone call to the

Department of Corrections' Central Records Office could have located
229

Zurla.

The district attorney's office failed to make this phone call. 230

Subsequently, on July 9, 1987, Zurla moved to dismiss the shoplifting
charges, claiming that his speedy trial right had been violated.2 3 '
The district court denied Zurla's motion to dismiss and Zurla was
convicted of shoplifting. 23 2 The court of appeals affirmed. 233 On appeal,

the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and held that the seventeen-month delay violated Zurla's speedy trial right. 23 4 Upon independent
review of the court of appeal's decision, the supreme court held that the
court of appeals assigned too little weight to the first three Barker

218. When a defendant asserts the right to a speedy trial, he is required to prove each element

except the reason for delay. State v. Tartaglia, 108 N.M. 411, 416, 773 P.2d 356, 361 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 108 N.M. 318, 772 P.2d 352 (1989), overruled in part, Zurla v. State, 109 N.M. 640,
789 P.2d 588 (1990).

219. Zurla v. State, 109 N.M. 640, 789 P.2d 588 (1990); State v. Tartaglia, 109 N.M. 801, 791

P.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1990); Work v. State, 111 N.M.
220. 109 N.M. 640, 789 P.2d 588 (1990).
221. Id. at 641, 789 P.2d at 589.

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 645, 789 P.2d at 593.
Id. at 641, 789 P.2d at 589.
Id.
Id.

231. Id.

232. Id. at 641-42, 789 P.2d at 589-90.
233. Id. at 641, 789 P.2d at 589.
234. Id. at 648, 789 P.2d at 596.

145, 803 P.2d 234 (1990).
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factors. 235 The court also held that the court of appeals erred in concluding
that the state had prevailed on the prejudice factor. 236 The court addressed
each of the four Barker factors in turn.
a. Length of Delay
The first factor, the length of delay, is regarded as a "triggering
mechanism. ' 23 7 Unless the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial,
there is no reason to analyze the remaining three factors in the balancing
test.238 Whether the length of delay in a particular case acts to trigger
inquiry into the remaining Barker factors depends on the specific circumstances of the case.239
In Zurla, the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the court of
appeals and held that the seventeen-month delay between Zurla's arrest
The presumption 24of
and trial date was "presumptively prejudicial."
Barker factors. '
three
remaining
the
into
inquiry
prejudice prompted
The court concluded that the court of appeals had weighed the seventeenmonth delay too lightly in Zurla's favor. 4 2 The court reasoned that the
shoplifting charges against Zurla constituted a relatively simple case.24 3
The seventeen-month period of incarceration was viewed as unacceptably
long in the context of a relatively simple crime.
b. Reason for Delay
The court then addressed the state's reason for the delay. Barker drew
distinctions between intentional state delay tactics, state negligence resulting in delay, and valid reasons for delay. 2" Any attempt by the state
intentionally to hinder the defense effort through the use of delay tactics
was weighed heavily against the state. 24 Negligent reasons for delay, such
as overcrowded courts, constitute a more neutral reason and weigh less
reasons for delay, such as missing
heavily against the state. 2" Valid
24 7
witnesses, serve to justify delay.

235. Id. at 642, 789 P.2d at 590.
236. Id.
237. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 530-31.
240. Zurla, 109 N.M. at 642, 789 P.2d at 590.
241. Id. (citing State v Grissom, 106 N.M. 555, 561-62, 746 P.2d 661, 667-68 (Ct. App. 1987);
4
State v. Kilpatrick, 104 .M. 441, 444, 722 P.2d 692, 695 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104 N.M. 378,
721 P.2d 1309 (1986)).
242. Id. The court of appeals had found that although the three factors of length of delay,
reason for delay, and defendant's assertion of the right weighed in his favor, they did not weigh
heavily in his favor. Id.
243. Id. The supreme court noted that the length of delay "[which] can be tolerated for an
ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious ... charge." Id. (quoting Barker, 407
U.S. at 531).
244. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

The court of appeals found the state was merely negligent in failing
to locate Zurla and did not weigh this factor heavily against the state.248
Presumably, the court of appeals followed the Supreme Court in Barker,
which considered negligent delay a "neutral reason" to be weighed "less
heavily" against the state. 249 By contrast, the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that merely labeling the state's reason as "negligent delay" does
not automatically fix the weight to be given to this factor. 2 0
In this case, the supreme court found that the state demonstrated
"bureaucratic indifference" by failing to inquire into Zurla's whereabouts
despite notice that he was housed in the state's own corrections facility.2 5
Such "bureaucratic indifference" was held to weigh more heavily against
the state than simple case overload. 25 2 The state's indifference is particularly apparent considering that Zurla timely asserted his speedy trial
right. 253 Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognizes a new category
of state-caused delay called "bureaucratic indifference," which establishes
a middle ground between intentional state delay tactics and negligent
state delay.
What distinguishes "bureaucratic indifference" from negligence is not
completely clear from Zurla. Perhaps "bureaucratic indifference" simply
indicates that the state was grossly negligent in failing to bring the
defendant to trial. The decision in Zurla does demonstrate that the court
will carefully scrutinize the state's reason for delay and weigh this factor
heavily against the state if the conduct of the state exhibits indifference
to the defendant's speedy trial right.
c. Assertion of the Right
Next, the supreme court considered what weight to give to Zurla's
assertion of his speedy trial right. 2 4 The court of appeals weighed this
factor in Zurla's favor, but not heavily. 255 The supreme court disagreed
with the court of appeals and weighed this factor heavily in Zurla's
favor, noting that "the assertion of the right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in deciding whether a speedy trial violation has taken
place. ' 25 6 The early assertion of the right is entitled to this weight because

248. Zurla, 109 N.M. at 643, 789 P.2d at 591.
249. Id.
250. Id. (citingGraves v. United States, 490 A.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1064, overruled in part on other grounds sub nom. Sell v. United States, 525 A.2d 1017
(D.C. 1987); Taylor v. State, 429 So. 2d 1172, 1174 (Ala. Crim. App.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 950
(1983)).
251. Id. at 643-44, 789 P.2d at 591-92. The court also believed that the state demonstrated
"indifference" by not inquiring into Zurla's whereabouts in light of Zurla's timely assertion of his
speedy trial right and because of the uncomplicated nature of the charges against him. Id. at 643,
789 P.2d at 591.
252. Id. at 644, 789 P.2d at 592.
253. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Lutoff, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 434, 440 N.E.2d 52 (1982)).
254. Id.
255. ld. at 642, 789 P.2d at 590. "[Tlhe court of appeals incorrectly weighed the first three
Barker v. Wingo factors too lightly in favor of the defendant ...." Id.
256. Id. at 644, 789 P.2d at 592. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32).
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it "indicates the defendant's desire to have the charges resolved rather
than gambling that the passage of time will operate to hinder prosecution. ' 257 A timely assertion of the speedy trial right, while not absolutely
necessary, will be weighed heavily in the defendant's favor.
d. Prejudice to the Defendant
The court then examined the final factor of prejudice to the defendant.
Barker recognizes three distinct types of prejudice intended to be prevented
by securing a speedy trial. 258 The speedy trial right seeks to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration, the anxiety and concern of the accused,
25 9 The court of appeals
and the possibility of impairment to the defense.
held that Zurla failed to show any elements of prejudice resulting from
the seventeen-month delay. 26° Although the New Mexico Supreme Court
found the prejudice to Zurla was slight, it reversed and found that Zurla
had suffered oppressive pretrial incarceration and impairment to his
defense. 261
The issue of oppressive pretrial incarceration involved the question of
whether Zurla had lost the possibility of serving concurrent sentences. 2262
64
The court of appeals, relying on State v. Tarango 263 and State v. Powers,
held that Zurla suffered no prejudice from the loss of the possibility of
serving concurrent sentences.261 According to the court of appeals, Zurla
had no right to serve concurrent sentences because the loss of the pos266
sibility of serving concurrent sentences did not amount to prejudice.
The supreme court, however, relied upon Smith v. Hooey267 and held
that "loss of the possibility of serving concurrent sentences constitutes
an aspect of prejudice." 2,6 Thus, the supreme court expressly overruled
Tarango and Powers to the extent that they disagree with Smith v.
Hooey. 269
The supreme court then considered whether Zurla suffered impairment
to his defense. Zurla claimed prejudice to his defense because two key
had left New Mexico following his arrest and could
defense witnesses
270
located.
be
not

257. Id.

258. 407 U.S. at 532.
259. Zurla, 109 N.M. at 644, 789 P.2d at 592 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 645, 789 P.2d at 593.
262. Id.
263. 105 N.M. 592, 734 P.2d 1275 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 521, 734 P.2d 761 (1987).
The Tarango court held that "the possibility of serving a sentence concurrently is not a right and
cannot be construed as actual prejudice." Id. at 598, 734 P.2d at 1281 (citing State v. Powers, 97
N.M. 32, 636 P.2d 303 (Ct. App. 1981)).
264. 97 N.M. 32, 636 P.2d 303 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the possibility of serving concurrent
sentences is only a possibility, not a right, and does not result in actual prejudice).
265. Zurla, 109 N.M. at 645, 789 P.2d at 593.
266. Id.
267. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
268. Zurla, 109 N.M. at 645, 789 P.2d at 593.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 641, 789 P.2d at 589.
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The court of appeals held that Zurla bore the burden of proving
prejudice and failed to establish prejudice. 27' The court of appeals relied
on State v. Tartaglia,27 2 which held that the defendant must present
specific proof of prejudice and may not simply rely on the presumption
of prejudice arising from the length of delay. 273 Tartaglia, which is based
on Barker and United States v. Loud Hawk,274 holds that the presumption
of prejudice is a mere triggering mechanism which does not carry forward
to establish the actual prejudice necessary to prevail on the fourth prong
275
of the Barker analysis.
The supreme court disagreed with the reasoning of Tartaglia and held
that if the defendant establishes presumptively prejudicial delay, the
burden of persuasion then shifts to the state to establish that no speedy
trial violation occurred. 276 The court expressly overruled Tartaglia "[t]o
the extent it suggests the state does not have this burden. ' 277 Thus, Zurla
departs from Barker and Loud Hawk by deciding that the presumption
of prejudice which triggers initial inquiry into the four Barker factors
now carries forward to become a presumption of prejudice with respect
to the prejudice prong of the Barker analysis. The state will now have
the burden of persuasion to demonstrate that a speedy trial violation
has not taken place, once a presumption of prejudice is raised. 278 By
contrast, Barker and Loud Hawk refused to allow the initial presumption
of prejudice to carry forward to the prejudice prong of the Barker
analysis because the presumption was a mere triggering mechanism. Prior
to Zurla, the defendant was required to "present specific corroboration
of his contention of prejudice. ' 279 Now, the state must overcome the
initial presumption of prejudice by persuading the court that the defendant
was not prejudiced by the delay.
When analyzing whether Zurla's defense was impaired, the court considered the actions of the defendant and the state. Zurla failed to show
whether he had attempted to locate the missing witnesses and failed to
demonstrate a causal relationship between the delay and the loss of the
witnesses' testimony. The state did not show how the evidence controverted
the presumption of prejudice as applied to the loss of this testimony. 280

271. Id. at 645, 789 P.2d at 593.
272. 108 N.M. 411, 773 P.2d 356 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 318, 772 P.2d 352 (1989),

overruled in part, Zurla v. State, 109 N.M. 640, 789 P.2d 588 (1990).
273. Id. at 415, 773 P.2d at 360. The "presumption of prejudice" referred to is the presumption
that arises under the first Barker factor, as a result of the length of delay. Id. This presumption
merely acts to trigger analysis into the remaining three Barker factors and "does not function to
summarily answer the separate factor of prejudice to a defendant." Id.
274. 474 U.S. 302 (1986). In Loud Hawk, the court held that the "possibility of prejudice is
not sufficient to support respondents' position that their speedy trial rights were violated." Id. at
315.
275. Tartaglia, 108 N.M at 415, 773 P.2d at 360 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Loud Hawk,
474 U.S. 302).
276. Zurla, 109 N.M. at 646, 789 P.2d at 594.

277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Tartaglia, 108 N.M. at 416, 773 P.2d at 361 (citing State v. Grissom, 106 N.M. 555, 746
P.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1987)).
280. Zurla, 109 N.M. at 647-48, 789 P.2d at 595-96.

Summer 1991]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

When the evidence was viewed as a whole, the court held that the state
did not meet its burden of persuasion to demonstrate that Zurla's defense
" '
had not been impaired. 28
2. State v. Tartaglia - Refinements of Zurla v. State
On appeal after remand, following the decision in Zurla, the court of
appeals reconsidered State v. Tartaglia.2 2 In the second Tartaglia appeal,
the court of appeals further refined speedy trial analysis.
Tartaglia was indicted for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia
on March 12, 1985, while incarcerated for a parole violation.283 Tartaglia
was sent a notice of the indictment. When Tartaglia failed to appear,
a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. 214 Neither Tartaglia nor prison
officials were aware of the outstanding bench warrant when Tartaglia
was released. 2 5 Tartaglia was subsequently arrested on February 26, 1987,
and he posted bond the following day. 28 6 A formal arraignment took
place on March 6, 1987.287 On the basis of the two-year delay between
his indictment and arraignment, Tartaglia filed a28 motion to dismiss
claiming a violation of his right to a speedy trial.
On second appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that despite
an absence of prejudice, Tartaglia's speedy trial right had been violated
28 9
because the first three Barker factors weighed heavily in his favor.
While recognizing "the prejudice factor focuses most directly on the goals
of the speedy trial clause," 290 the court emphasized that actual prejudice
is not required to justify dismissal if the length of delay, the reason for
delay and the assertion of the right all weigh substantially in the defendant's favor. 291 Thus, the court abrogated the necessity of actual prejudice
within the Barker analytical framework. A defendant can now prevail
on a speedy trial claim in the absence of actual prejudice.
3. Work v. State - Further Refinements of Zurla v. State
Finally, in Work v. State,292 the New Mexico Supreme Court further
explained its application of the Barker factors and its holding in Zurla.
281. Id. at 648, 789 P.2d at 596. Justice Baca dissented from the majority opinion in Zurla,
adopting the memorandum opinion from the court of appeals as his dissent. Id. at 649, 789 P.2d
at 597.
282. 109 N.M. 801, 791 P.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1990).
283. Tartaglia, 108 N.M. at 413, 773 P.2d at 358.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Tartaglia, 109 N.M. 801, 803, 791 P.2d 76, 78 (1990). The court agreed with the defendant's
claim that "the relevant time period was twenty-four months from defendant's indictment until his
arrest and arraignment." Id. at 802-03, 791 P.2d at 77-78. The court weighed the two-year delay
in "a relatively simple drug case" fairly heavily against the state. Id. at 803, 791 P.2d at 78. The
court found the reason for delay to be "bureaucratic indifference" and also weighed this factor
heavily against the state. Id. The court also found that the defendant had "timely asserted his
[speedy trial] right by filing a motion to dismiss shortly after his .arrest on the indictment." Id.
290. Id. at 803, 791 P.2d at 78 (citing United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1980)).
291. Id.
292. 111 N.M. 145, 803 P.2d 234 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1413 (1991).
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The court addressed all four Barker factors and held that John Work's

right to a speedy trial had been violated.
Work was arrested and charged with criminal solicitation on April 24,
1986.293 On September 22, 1986, the charges were dismissed without
prejudice pending a grand jury hearing. 294 On December 17, 1987, the
grand jury indicted Work on four counts of criminal solicitation and
one count of aggravated battery.2 95 A trial was scheduled for August 22,
1988.2 96 On July 11, 1988, Work moved to dismiss the charges on speedy
trial grounds. 297 The trial court granted the motion
after a hearing and
298
dismissed Work's indictment with prejudice.
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the decision

of the trial court. 299 The court found the length of the delay and the
assertion of the speedy trial right to be in Work's favor.3 0 The court,

however, decided that the reasons for delay favored the state and that
Work "had

the 'burden of proof' to show prejudice." '0 The court

determined that Work had failed to make such a showing. After balancing
the four Barker factors, the court of appeals held that Work's speedy
30 2
trial right had not been violated.
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding

that Work's right to a speedy trial had been violated. 03 In making this
decision, the supreme court reiterated its application of the four Barker
factors and discussed, in relevant part, the length of delay, the reason
for the delay, the assertion of the speedy trial right, and prejudice to
3 4
the defendant. 0
a. Length of Delay
The court of appeals held that any pre-indictment delay following
dismissal of the magistrate court charges should not be included as part

of the length of delay.305 The court of appeals found the remaining

293. Id. at 146, 803 P.2d at 235.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. The court placed primary emphasis on the conclusion that Work "had not established
prejudice from the delay, as contemplated by the fourth Barker factor." Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 146-47, 803 P.2d at 235-36. Regarding the assertion of the right by the defendant,
the supreme court agreed with the court of appeals and held that the defendant's timely assertion
of his speedy trial right weighed in his favor. Id. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236. However, Justice Wilson's
dissenting opinion points out that Work's assertion of his speedy trial right was seriously undermined
by his substantial contributions to the pre-trial delay period and his apparent attempts to avoid
trial. See id. at 152, 803 P.2d at 241 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236. In analyzing the length of delay, the trial court considered the
"entire [twenty-eight month] time period from [Work's] arrest on April 24, 1986, to the date of
the hearing on the motion to dismiss the indictment, August 18, 1988." Id. This time period included
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thirteen months to be the relevant time period and presumptively prej-

of
udicial.2 6 The majority of the supreme court agreed with the court .307

appeals, thus triggering inquiry into the remaining three Barker factors
The supreme court declined to consider whether pre-indictment delay
30 8
should be considered as an aspect of the total length of delay.
b. Reason for Delay
In determining the weight to be given to the reason for the delay, the
supreme court noted that Work was responsible for several periods of
3a 9 Despite Work's subdelay that constituted the total length of delay.

stantial contribution to the delay, the supreme court held that the reason
310
for delay was neutral, or at most, "somewhat in favor of the state."
The supreme court held that the state had violated Work's right
speedy trial despite the fact that Work himself caused delays in the
process.
It is paradoxical that a defendant can contribute significantly to
trial delay and eventually prevail against the state by claiming a

to a
trial
prestate

violation of his speedy trial right."' The New Mexico Supreme Court

has weakened the "reason for delay" factor by allowing the defendant
to cause pre-trial delay and then prevail on a speedy trial claim. Arguably,
this decision may provide incentives for a defendant to contribute to
pre-trial delay in order to build and establish delay time that is pre-

a fifteen-month delay period "between [the] magistrate court dismissal and [the] grand jury indictment." Id. The majority and the court of appeals did not include the fifteen-month preindictment
period as part of the delay period because there were "no charges pending" against Work during
the fifteen months and there were "no restraints on his liberty." Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. Justice Wilson, dissenting from the majority, did not regard the thirteen-month delay
as sufficiently lengthy to be presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 151, 803 P.d at 240 (Wilson, J.,
dissenting). Justice Wilson would consider the thirteen-month delay to be a sequence of two
proceedings, consisting of five and eight months respectively. Id. Because there was no presumption
of prejudice arising from the thirteen-month period, Justice Wilson would not have considered the
remaining three Barker factors. Id.
308. Id. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236. By declining to decide whether preindictment delay should be
counted as part of the length of delay, the court ignored the opportunity to decide a hotly contested
issue. The trial court held that the fifteen month preindictment period was part of the total length
of delay. Id. at 146, 803 P.2d at 235. Similarily, Justice Ransom held the preindictment period to
be part of the length of delay. Id. at 150, 803 P.2d at 239 (Ransom, J., specially concurring).
309. Id. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236. Work was responsible for a period of delay occurring before
the original charges were dismissed on September 22, 1986, and following the grand jury indictment
on December 17, 1987. Id. at 146, 803 P.2d at 235.
310. Id. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236. Work substantially contributed to pre-trial delay. Id. at 152,
803 P.2d at 241 (Wilson, J., dissenting). He "twice waived the time limits for preliminary hearings
and on three occasions obtained additional time in which to file pretrial motions while he sought
[superintending writs] from [the] court." Id.
311. Justice Wilson, dissenting, commented on the majority's decision to allow Work to contribute
to the pre-trial delay and eventually prevail on speedy trial grounds. Id. (Wilson, J., dissenting).
Wilson regarded Work's contribution to pre-trial delay as undermining his assertion of the speedy
trial right. Id. He noted that Work "substantially contributed to the delay of both the first and
second proceedings." Id. Furthermore, "the defendant's complaint of delay, filed approximately
five weeks prior to the scheduled trial, was not calculated to put the state on notice that the
Justice Wilson perceived Work as attempting "to escape
Id.
I..."
defendant wanted a speedy trial .
the consequences of trial altogether." Id.
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sumptively prejudicial.' 12 Thus, New Mexico allows a defendant to contribute to his own pre-trial delay and then successfully claim that the
state has violated his speedy trial right.
c. Prejudice to Defendant
The decision in Work clearly reemphasizes the holding in Zurla on
prejudice to the defendant. Further, Work highlights the situations in
which the presumption of prejudice to the defendant is accorded great
weight as opposed to when the presumption is entitled to minimal weight.
The court of appeals held that Work, not the state, had the burden
of proving that the delay had been prejudicial and that Work had not
met this burden." 3 In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court
reemphasized that the original presumption of prejudice, used to trigger
inquiry into the remaining three Barker factors, "carries forward" and
shifts the burden to the state to establish on balance that no speedy trial
violation has occurred.3 14 Thus, because the state failed to rebut the
presumption of prejudice, this factor was found to weigh in Work's
favor.3" 5 Work clearly follows Zurla and establishes that the presumption
of prejudice arising from a given length of delay carries forward into
the analysis of the fourth factor.3" 6
The court clarified that, in some instances, the presumption of prejudice
will be accorded great weight. Work re-enforces the court of appeals'
decision in Tartagliaby holding that under some circumstances the delay
may be so long that it is "well-nigh conclusive" of prejudice so that
proof of actual prejudice becomes unnecessary.3"7 The presumption of
prejudice may by itself be enough to tip the balance of the fourth factor
in favor of the accused in cases where the accused has been subjected
to long periods of pre-trial delay or has prevailed on the first three
Barker factors."

312. The decision that a defendant can contribute to his own pre-trial delay and still prevail
against the state on a speedy trial claim may be a manifestation of the court's adamant contention
that the Barker test is a balancing process, with no single factor being determinative. Zurla, 109
N.M. at 642, 789 P.2d at 590 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).
313. Work, Ill N.M. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236. In formulating this holding, the court of appeals
relied on State v. Tartaglia, 108 N.M. 411, 773 P.2d 356 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 318,
772 P.2d 352 (1989). Id. However, Zurla v. State, 109 N.M. 640, 789 P.2d 588 (1990), overruled
Tartaglia's holding to the extent that the state had no burden of persuasion to rebut the defendant's
presumption of prejudice. Work, 111 N.M. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236 (citing Zurla, 109 N.M. at
646, 789 P.2d at 594).
314. Work, 111 N.M. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236.
315. Id. at 148, 803 P.2d at 237.
316. Id. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236. Justice Wilson asserts in his dissenting opinion that "Zurla
misapplied Barker" by holding that the presumption of prejudice arising from the first factor
"carries forward" to become part of the fourth factor. Id. at 152, 803 P.2d at 241 (Wilson, J.,
dissenting). Justice Wilson contended that requiring the state to bear the burden of persuasion to
rebut a presumption of prejudice forces the state to "positively prove a negative." Id. at 153, 803
P.2d at 242.
317. Id. at 148, 803 P.2d at 237 (citing United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1116 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977)).
318. Id. When the first three Barker factors weigh heavily in favor of the accused, then "prejudice
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The characterization of the presumption of prejudice was taken one
step further. The state is entitled to rebut any presumption of prejudice,
and has the burden of doing so. 3' 9 In Work, the supreme court held the
state can fulfill its burden by establishing valid reasons for the delay or
an untimely assertion of the right and acquiesence by the defendant to
the delay, and by showing the accused was not actually prejudiced by
the delay.320 These alternatives amount to no more than rebutting the
last three Barker factors. The irony is that a case in which the presumption
of prejudice is given great weight will invariably be a case where the
first three Barker factors weigh heavily in the defendant's favor.3 2' Therefore, it would seem nearly impossible for the state to rebut factors that
some flexibility by
already weigh against it. The court, however, allows '322
finding that these alternatives are "not all-inclusive.

Nevertheless, in some instances, the presumption of prejudice may be
designated little or no weight. 23 First, the presumption will carry less
weight when the defendant makes no attempt to demonstrate actual
prejudice resulting from the delay. 324 Second, the court implied that the
presumption will carry less weight when the length of delay, the reason
for the delay, and the assertion of the speedy trial right do not weigh
in favor of the defendant. 2 As a result, a defendant increases the chances
of prevailing on a speedy trial claim if actual prejudice can be demonstrated, especially if the other factors in the analysis do not weigh in
the defendant's favor.3 26 Work successfully demonstrated actual prejudice,
unrebutted by the state, and ultimately prevailed in his claim. Work
proved potential impairment to his defense by first illustrating the "weak-

becomes totally irrelevant." Id. (citing Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100). Thus, even in the absence of actual
prejudice, the accused is able to prevail if the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial, the
reason for the delay is weighed heavily against the state, and the accused has timely asserted his
right.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)).
321. Id. at 148, 803 P.2d at 237 (citing Avalos, 541 F.2d at 1116).
322. Id. at 147 n.1, 803 P.2d at 236 n.l. Other reasons offered by the state, other than rebutting
the last three Barker factors, may be acceptable in countering the presumption of prejudice. Id.
The court did not indicate what these circumstances might be.
323. Id. at 148, 803 P.2d at 237 (citing Zurla, 109 N.M. at 646, 789 P.2d at 594; State v.
Holtslander, 102 Idaho 306, 313, 629 P.2d 702, 709 (1981)).
324. Id.
325. Id. If neither party presents evidence on prejudice, the presumption of prejudice "may have
greater or lesser significance in the balancing process depending on the length of the delay and the
weights assigned to the other factors." Id.
326. The defendant may offer evidence "to corroborate the presumption [of prejudice]." Id.
Work underscores the necessity to demonstrate actual prejudice. Work reinforced the initial presumption of prejudice by showing actual prejudice to his case resulting from the pre-trial delay.
See id. Work arguably had weaknesses in his speedy trial claim. While the thirteen-month delay
was presumptively prejudicial and Work timely asserted his right to a speedy trial, he also substantially
contributed to the delay. Id. at 152, 803 P.2d at 241 (Wilson, J., dissenting). Thus, the reason for
delay was found to be "somewhat in favor of the state." Id. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236. As noted
earlier, the presumption of prejudice carries less weight when the first three Barker factors do not
favor the defendant. Because Work only prevailed on two Barker factors, the presumption of
prejudice might not have tipped the fourth Barker factor in his favor absent the showing of actual
prejudice.
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ness of a witness' memory" and secondly, by establishing that the "first
degree murder charges . . . caused him humiliation and embarrassment 27

and affected his reputation

....

"328

Right to Speedy Trial - Claims Raised Under the Six-Month
Rule
The United States Supreme Court has found "no constitutional basis
4.

for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified

number of days or months. ' 3 29 The court, however, did declare that

states may define reasonable time periods "consistent with constitutional
standards," within which a criminal trial must begin. 330 New Mexico's
" ' sets forth specific conditions which trigger the running
six-month rule33
of the six-month time period within which a defendant's criminal proceeding must commence.
State v. Sanchez332 reaffirms that any one of the seven enumerated
events in New Mexico Rule of Criminal Procedure 5-604 acts to "suspend
the proceeding" at the district court level, rather than to toll the six-

month period."' Sanchez was arraigned on a charge of first-degree murder
on July 8, 1987.114 The state subsequently received an extension of time

from the supreme court, set to expire on February 5, 1988.115 In January,
the first-degree murder charge was negotiated to a plea of guilty to
voluntary manslaughter. 336 The hearing to enter the plea was scheduled

for March 15, 1988. 31 7 The trial court rejected the plea agreement when

the victim's family opposed such an agreement. 33 The trial commenced
on September 6, 1988, and Sanchez was convicted of first-degree murder. 3 9
In appealing his conviction, Sanchez contended that his trial took place
in violation of the New Mexico speedy trial statute because the proceedings

327. Id. at 148, 803 P.2d at 237. The court of appeals found that "humiliation and embarrassment"
could generally be categorized "under the rubric of 'anxiety and concern of the accused."' .Id.
Although the court of appeals held that "anxiety and concern of the accused" did not entail stress
exceeding that attending most criminal prosecutions, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that "the
existence of such anxiety and concern is . . . a sub-factor to be considered in" the assessment of
prejudice. Id.
328. Id. Justice Ransom wrote a specially concurring opinion in which he found the "presumption
of prejudice entitled to little weight when consideration is limited to the thirteen-month delay
consisting of five months during which charges were pending in the magistrate court and eight
months following the indictment." Id. at 149, 803 P.2d at 238 (Ransom, J.,specially concurring).
Nonetheless, Justice Ransom concurred in the result because he concluded that the fifteen-month
preindictment delay should be included as part of the delay period, making the total delay period
twenty-eight months. Id. at 150, 803 P.2d at 239. The presumption of prejudice is weighed more
heavily against the state for a twenty-eight month delay. Id.
329. Barker, 407 U.S. at 523.
330. Id.
331. N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-604(B).
332. 109 N.M. 313, 785 P.2d 224 (1989).
333. Id. at 316-17, 785 P.2d at 227-28; see N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-604.
334. Sanchez, 109 N.M. at 316, 785 P.2d at 227.
335. Id. The state was granted an extension of time pursuant to N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-604(C).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 314, 785 P.2d at 225.

Summer 19911

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

commenced more than six months after his arraignment. 340 The supreme
court found that the act of negotiating the plea "suspend[ed] the proceedings." 3 4' By negotiating the plea Sanchez impliedly consented to extend
the date for trial beyond the February 5 deadline
and to six months past
3 42
March 15, the date the plea was ruled upon.
Furthermore, the court discussed the effect of this circumstance on the
six-month rule.3 43 The court asserted that the six-month rule does not
simply recommence after interruption. 44 Rather, the six-month period
does not apply when one of the circumstances contemplated by the statute
is in effect.3 45 When the circumstance ceases to be in effect, a new sixmonth period begins. 346
B.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The sixth amendment of the Constitution of the United States sets
forth that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 3 47 The
Supreme Court has long held that the right to counsel means the right
to effective assistance of counsel. 4 The purpose behind the right to
effective counsel is to guarantee the accused a fair trial in the adversarial
system.3 49 Thus, the right to effective assistance of counsel is grounded
in "the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing." 350 If the performance of
the accused's counsel causes the process to lose its character as an
adversarial proceeding, the constitutional right is violated.35 '
The following section examines five cases which addressed ineffective
assistance claims during the current survey period.35 2 In these cases, the

340. Id. at 315, 785 P.2d at 226.
341. Id. at 316-17, 785 P.2d at 227-28 (quoting State v. Mendoza, 108 N.M. 446, 449, 774 P.2d
440, 443 (1989)).
342. Id. at 316, 785 P.2d at 227. The court agreed with the state's argument, which asserted
that the pivotal date for assessing a violation of the six month rule was March 15, the date the
plea was rejected. Id. This decision is consistent with N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-604, which allows the
"trial of a criminal case [to] . . . commence six . . . months after . . . the date the court allows
...the rejection of a plea ....
N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-604(B).
343. Sanchez, 109 N.M. at 316, 785 P.2d at 227.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
348. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 n.14 (1970)). This proposition is suggested by the text of the sixth amendment. Id. "The
Amendment requires not merely the provision of counsel to the accused, but 'Assistance' at trial,"
which is to be "for his defence." Id. If the accused receives no actual assistance, then his constitutional
right is deemed to be violated. Id.
349. Id. at 656-57.
350. Id. at 656. "When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted - even if defense
counsel may have made demonstrable errors - the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment
has occurred." Id.
351. Id. at 656-57.
352. State v. Crislip, 109 N.M. 351, 785 P.2d 262 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 262, 784
P.2d 1005 (1989); State v. Newman, 109 N.M. 263, 784 P.2d 1006 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109
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court announced the applicable standard with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals applied the Strickland3 standards
to claims of counsel ineffectiveness during trial. Furthermore, the court
addressed whether multiple representation of co-defendants led to ineffectiveness. Finally, during the survey period, the court considered whether
denial of a defense-requested motion for continuance rendered the defense
attorney unprepared and ineffective. The survey cases provide a unique
factual contrast because counsel was held ineffective in some cases and
effective in others.
1. Application of the Strickland Standards - Counsel Found
ineffective
In Strickland v. Washington,354 the United States Supreme Court set
forth a two-part test for determining whether the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel has been violated by deficient counsel performance.
Strickland requires the defendant to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.355 To determine whether counsel's performance was deficient,
the court decides whether the performance was that of a reasonably
competent attorney in light of the surrounding circumstances.3 5 6 The
second requirement, proof of prejudice, requires the defendant to show
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. 3 7 Finally, the reviewing
court must be "highly deferential" and presume that counsel has rendered
adequate assistance.3 5
In State v. Crislip,359 the New Mexico Court of Appeals applied the
Strickland standard to Crislip's ineffective assistance claim. Defendant
Patrice Crislip was accused of child abuse resulting in the death of her
child. 360 Crislip's fourteen-month-old son died after being hospitalized
with multiple fractures to the skull.3 6 ' Both Crislip and her husband,

N.M. 262, 784 P.2d 1005 (1989); State v. Stenz, 109 N.M. 536, 787 P.2d 455 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 109 N.M. 562, 787 P.2d 842 (1990); State v. Santillanes, 109 N.M. 781, 790 P.2d 1062
(Ct. App. 1990); State v. Brazeal, 109 N.M. 752, 790 P.2d 1033 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M.
631, 788 P.2d 931 (1990).
353. These standards were enunciated in the United States Supreme Court case of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). For an explanation of these factors, see infra notes 354-58 and
accompanying text.
354. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
355. Id. at 687.
356. Id. According to Strickland, "[tlhe court must ... determine whether, in light of all the
circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance." Id. at 690.
357. Id. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." Id.

358. Id.at 689.
359. 109 N.M. 351, 785 P.2d 262 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 262, 784 P.2d 1005 (1989).
360. Id. at 353, 785 P.2d at 264.
361. Id.
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Robert Crislip, were charged with child abuse resulting in death.3 62 Patrice
and Robert were tried separately and were assigned separate counsel
because each implicated the other in the death of their son.3 63 Patrice
was tried and convicted. 36 On appeal, Patrice alleged
that her right to
65
effective assistance of counsel had been denied.1
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reviewed several alleged instances
of attorney incompetence which had occurred prior to or during Patrice
Crislip's trial. In determining whether counsel had been ineffective, the
court applied the two-part Strickland test to determine whether Crislip's
attorney had performed below the standard of a reasonably competent
attorney and whether her defense had been prejudiced.3a The court
specifically addressed three alleged acts of incompetence.
The first alleged act of incompetence occurred on direct examination
where Patrice denied abusing her child.3 67 During cross-examination, the
prosecutor made repeated references to an out-of-court statement made
by Robert Crislip that he saw Patrice beating their3 6child several days
before the child was hospitalized with fatal injuries. 1
The prosecutor brought this statement before the jury to attack the
credibility of Patrice regarding a claimed memory loss reported to have
happened the day she allegedly beat her child. 69 This "blackout claim"
was never made a part of Patrice's defense during trial.3 70 Patrice's counsel
failed to object to the use of this out-of-court statement.3 7' Furthermore,
Crislip's attorney failed to take any protective action whatsoever.3 72 The
court, sua sponte, gave a limiting instruction on this evidence.3 7 3 Furthermore, after 3conviction
the court questioned the defense counsel's
74
failure to object.
At issue was whether Crislip's attorney was incompetent by not taking
protective measures regarding the use of Robert's out-of-court statement.
The court first noted that out-of-court statements made by a codefendant
are "presumptively unreliable" and "less credible than ordinary hearsay"

362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. Robert Crislip, originally scheduled to be tried before defendant, disappeared prior to
trial and was still missing at the time Crislip was tried. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 353-57, 785 P.2d at 264-68. The court recognized that the standard for deciding
whether counsel was ineffective is "whether defense counsel exercised the skill, judgment, and
diligence of a reasonably competent attorney." Id. at 353, 785 P.2d at 264 (citing State v. Orona,
97 N.M. 232, 638 P.2d 1077 (1982); State v. Dean, 105 N.M. 5, 727 P.2d 944 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 104 N.M. 702, 726 P.2d 856 (1986)).
367. Id. at 354, 785 P.2d at 265.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. With regard to the prosecution's use of the out-of-court statement of Robert Crislip,
"[d]efense counsel did not move to suppress [the] statement, did not object, did not move to strike
the state's reference to the statement, did not move for a mistrial, and did not even seek a limiting
instruction." Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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because codefendants are motivated by self interest-they are willing to
implicate another to avoid incrimination.3 75 Thus, the statement would
confrontation rights, had
have been inadmissable as violating Crislip's
76
Patrice's attorney made a timely objection.1
The state argued that Robert's statement was not introduced as substantive evidence, but rather was admissible to impeach Crislip's claim
of memory loss during the day the incident allegedly happened.3 77 Patrice,
however, never raised a blackout defense during trial.3 7 Accordingly,
there was no legitimate purpose for the prosecution to introduce Robert's
statement because it was not admissible-to impeach any of Patrice's trial
testimony.3 79 The court of appeals held that Robert's statement was
inadmissible, and defense counsel should have objected to it.38 0
The court then addressed whether Patrice had been prejudiced by the
admission of her husband's statement. The court found that there was
no evidence that Patrice had ever beaten her child, except for Robert's
" ' Moreover, the state had not established a leout-of-court statement. 38
gitimate purpose for introducing Robert's statement.38 2 Furthermore, the
evidence would likely have been stricken had defense counsel correctly
moved for exclusion.3 3 The court utilized the Strickland standard to
determine if there was a "reasonable probability" that, absent the failure
of Crislip's attorney to take protective action regarding Robert Crislip's
damaging statement, the fact-finder would have had reasonable doubts
about Crislip's guilt. 84 Under this standard, the court held that the
statement was highly prejudicial to Crislip's case. 5
The second alleged act of incompetence was counsel's failure to oppose
the state's use of psychiatric testimony.3 6 Prior to trial, the district court
ordered a psychological evaluation of Patrice pursuant to her attorney's
motion.3 87 Patrice's attorney allowed the state access to the evaluation
report before he himself looked at it.3 88 Included in the report was a
defense witness list indicating that the defense might call a neuro-psychiatrist to testify. 8 9 As a result, the state was able to call Dr. Daugherty,
the psychiatrist who had performed Patrice's evaluation, as its witness. 9°

375. Id.at 355, 785 P.2d at 266. The court also noted that Crislip and her husband were being
tried separately "precisely because [their] defenses were antagonistic." Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 356, 785 P.2d at 267.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 355-56, 785 P.2d at 266-67.
381. Id. at 356, 785 P.2d at 267.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 354, 785 P.2d at 265 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).
385. Id. at 356, 785 P.2d at 267.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. Crislip's counsel did not subpoena Dr. Daugherty. Id.
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During the trial, Dr. Daugherty testified extensively for the state on
her evaluation of Patrice and the possible reasons why she might have
" ' As noted
experienced blackouts and memory loss. 39
previously, however,
Patrice never evoked a memory loss or blackout defense during trial.3 92
Evidence about blackouts and memory loss was introduced by the prosecution and tended to put Patrice's mental stability at issue. 93 The court
concluded that the prosecution improperly commented on Patrice's character because she had not placed her character at issue by raising a
memory loss defense. 394 In spite of this, Crislip's attorney failed to
object.3 95 The court held that Crislip's attorney had acted incompetently
by not objecting to Dr. Daugherty's testimony, but held that the testimony
was not prejudicial. 396 Despite a holding that Dr. Daugherty's testimony
was not prejudicial in and of itself, the court went on to hold that the
failure to object to the testimony "was cumulatively an aspect of ineffective assistance of counsel." 319
The court of appeals then addressed whether Crislip's counsel had been
ineffective in preparing for trial.3 98 Crislip argued that her attorney had
not properly investigated the case while preparing for trial and had not
developed any trial tactics.3 99 While the court emphasized that the strategy
of trial counsel should not be second-guessed on appeal, it also expressed
°
serious concerns about the defense attorney's preparation for trial. 0
Thus, the court considered the failure of Crislip's attorney to adequately
4
prepare for trial as an aspect of cumulative ineffectiveness. '
391. Id. The court stated that:
On direct examination, Dr. Daugherty testified that the purpose of her evaluation
was to determine the physical cause for blackouts and memory lapses defendant
reported experiencing. She testified that defendant had reported occasionally experiencing blackouts, usually for a few seconds or minutes, including a memory
loss for the entire day of March 24th. She also testified there was no evidence of
brain damage in defendant, but although the blackouts were not due to brain
damage, they could have other causes such as trauma or stress.
Id. The testimony that Crislip had no evidence of brain damage was likely used to attack Crislip's
credibility and character by implying that the blackout stories were fabricated.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 356-57, 785 P.2d at 267-68.
394. Id. at 357, 785 P.2d at 268.
395. Id.

396. Id.
397. Id. (citing State v. Talley, 103 N.M. 33, 702 P.2d 353 (Ct.App. 1985)). In Talley, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that multiple acts of attorney incompetence, while perhaps not
prejudicial in and of themselves, combined to become cumulative aspects of ineffective assistance
of counsel. See Talley, 103 N.M. at 37, 702 P.2d at 357. This doctrine of cumulative attorney
error bestows an advantage upon defendants who can conceivably show many small, unprejudicial
errors which collectively add up to counsel ineffectiveness.
398. Crislip, 109 N.M. at 357, 785 P.2d at 268.
399. Id. The only apparent trial tactic relied upon by Crislip's attorney was to hope that Robert
Crislip would be convicted prior to Crislip's trial, thereby giving her a basis for leniency. Id.
400. Id.
401. The court of appeals did not expressly state whether it considered the way in which Crislip's
attorney prepared for trial as an aspect of cumulative error. It appears that it did so, however,
because the court mentioned counsel's "failure to interview key witnesses prior to trial" in the
conclusion of the case, when discussing the combined errors that deprived Crislip of a fair trial.
Id. at 357-58, 785 P.2d at 268-69.
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The court held that, overall, Patrice's attorney had "failed to measure
up to the standard required of a reasonably competent attorney.'"4°2
Although recognizing that Patrice was not entitled to an error-free trial,
the court nonetheless found that the combined effect of multiple instances
of ineffective assistance prejudiced Patrice and denied her a fair trial. 4 3
2. Alternatives for Determining Ineffectiveness
Judge Hartz concurred in the result in Crislip, but stated in his concurring opinion that he would have reversed because of plain error rather
than ineffective assistance of counsel./ 4 In addition to the plain error
doctrine, Judge Hartz suggested two additional ways to dispose of ineffective assistance claims.
Judge Hartz contended that when a defendant claims counsel ineffectiveness the case should either be remanded to the trial court for a hearing
on the .issue or the defendant should be required to seek post-conviction
remedies under the New Mexico habeas corpus statute.45 Judge Hartz
believed that appellate courts could only speculate when trying to determine an attorney's trial tactics.4 Because such determinations are
without a formal record from a hearing, they are inefficient and prone
to error. 407 According to Judge Hartz, a hearing or habeas corpus proceeding would allow the attorney to explain fully his conduct and permit
the court to make an intelligent evaluation of whether "'counsel's acts
or omissions were within the range of reasonable competence."'
Ac-

402. Id. at 357, 785 P.2d at 268 (citing State v. Orona, 97 N.M. 232, 638 P.2d 1077, (1982);
State v. Taylor, 107 N.M. 66, 752 P.2d 781 (1988)).
403. Id. at 358, 785 P.2d at 269. The case was reversed and remanded to the trial court. Id.
404. Id. (Hartz, J., specially concurring). The plain error doctrine allows evidentiary matters to
be reviewed on appeal "despite failure of trial counsel to bring them to the attention of the trial
court." Id. at 359, 785 P.2d at 270 (citing State v. Wall, 94 N.M. 169, 608 P.2d 145 (1980); State
v. Lara, 88 N.M. 233, 539 P.2d 623 (Ct. App. 1975); State v. Sanchez, 86 N.M. 713, 526 P.2d
1306 (Ct. App. 1974)). Judge Hartz pointed out that: "'Plain error' has been characterized in
various ways such as 'grave errors which seriously affect substantial rights of the accused,' 'errors
that result in a clear miscarriage of justice,' errors that 'are obvious . . .' [or errors which] seriously
affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."' Id. (quoting United
States v. Campbell, 419 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1969)).
405. Id. at 358, 785 P.2d at 269. The habeas corpus remedy is a remedy to be sought after
exhausting all other remedies available to the defendant. See N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-802(B)(3). The
rule
governs the procedure for filing a writ of habeas corpus by persons in custody or
under restraint for a determination that such custody or restraint is, or will be, in
violation of the constitution or laws of the State of New Mexico or of the United
States; that the district court was without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence;
that the sentence was illegal or in excess of the maximum authorized by law or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack.
Id. 5-802(A).
406. Crislip, 109 N.M. at 358, 785 P.2d at 269.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 359, 785 P.2d at 270 (quoting People v. Pope, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 740, 590 P.2d
859, 867 (1979)).
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cordingly, Judge Hartz presumably favors the judicial deference enunciated
in Strickland.
Hartz's concurring opinion leaves open the possibility that the New
Mexico Court of Appeals may prefer remand or post-conviction remedies
when substantial claims of ineffective assistance are raised in future
cases. 410 State v. Stenz41 l substantiates this trend. In Stenz, the court of
appeals held that Stenz's attorney was not incompetent for failing to
make a motion to suppress
evidence where no basis existed in the record
42
to support the motion.
In dicta, the court discussed Judge Hartz's concurring opinion in Crislip.
The court agreed that substantial claims of counsel ineffectiveness should
be remanded to the trial court for a hearing or remedied through a
habeas corpus proceeding. 413 The court further asserted that because a
habeas corpus proceeding allows the defendant to establish a record of
counsel ineffectiveness, "remands would be appropriate only in ...
limited situations. ' 41 4 Thus, habeas corpus proceedings may provide the
remedy for future counsel ineffectiveness claims except for certain limited
situations in which remand would be appropriate.
3. No Sixth Amendment Violation - Counsel Effective
In State v. Newman,4 1 5 the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed
another claim that defense counsel was ineffective during trial. Newman
was tried and convicted of criminal sexual contact with a child under
the age of thirteen. 4 6 At the beginning of the trial, Newman's attorney
objected to a state's expert witness being allowed to testify. 4 7 Counsel
objected to the witness's qualifications as an expert counselor, therapist,
and psychologist. 418 The trial court sustained the motion in part and held
that the expert witness would not be allowed to give an opinion about
whether* she believed the child was telling the truth about the claimed
sexual contact. 4 9 During trial the expert proceeded to testify, without
solicitation from the state, that she believed the child was truthful regarding the alleged sexual contact with Newman. 420 Newman's attorney

409. See supra notes 353-58 and accompanying text.
410. See Crislip, 109 N.M. at 358, 785 P.2d at 269 (Hartz, J., specially concurring)..
411. 109 N.M. 536, 787 P.2d 455 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 562, 787 P.2d 842 (1990).
412. Id. at 538, 787 P.2d at 457.
413. Id. at 539, 787 P.2d at 458; see Crislip, 109 N.M. at 358, 785 P.2d at 269 (Hartz, J.,
specially concurring).
414. Stenz, 109 N.M. at 539, 787 P.2d at 458. The court gave an example of situations in which
remand would be appropriate, "such as when the trial record establishes a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel, but the state has not had an opportunity to present evidence to
rebut that prima facie case." Id.
415. 109 N.M. 263, 784 P.2d 1006 (Ct. App. 1989).
416. Id. at 264, 784 P.2d at 1007.
417. Id. at 265, 784 P.2d at 1008.
418. Id.
419. Id. The trial court did rule that "the witness could state her opinion concerning whether
the child's behavior was consistent with that of a sexually abused child." Id.
420. Id. at 267, 784 P.2d at 1010.
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promptly requested a cautionary instruction, and the trial court instructed
the jury to dismiss the witness's testimony regarding her opinion as to
the truthfulness of the child's allegations. 42'
On appeal, Newman asserted that his attorney failed to perform as a
reasonably competent attorney 422 because counsel sought a cautionary
instruction rather than a mistrial.4 23 The court noted that the decision
of Newman's attorney to ask for a cautionary instruction, rather than
for a mistrial, was a choice of trial tactics. 424 The court further recognized
that an appellate court is not free to second guess the trial tactics of a
trial attorney.4 25 Hence, the court held that trial counsel's decision to
ask for a cautionary instruction, rather than move for a mistrial, failed
426
to demonstrate either incompetence or prejudice to Newman's defense.
The basic distinction between effective and ineffective counsel is clearly
illustrated by comparing the decisions in Crislip and Newman. Crislip's
defense counsel clearly allowed damaging and improper hearsay testimony
to be heard by the jury with no protective action taken on Crislip's
behalf.4 27 As a result, ineffectiveness and resulting prejudice were clearly
shown. 428 In contrast, Newman's defense counsel responded quickly to
improper witness testimony. 429 The requested protective action was left
to the discretion of the trial counsel-not to be second guessed by the
appellate court. The request for a limiting instruction in Newman was
held to be a reasonable decision, although alternatives existed. Counsel's
decision was not found unreasonable, ineffective or prejudicial simply
because one option was pursued instead of another.
C. Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest
The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel can be violated where one attorney represents codefendants. 430 Moreover, when joint representation occurs for
defendants having conflicts of interest, a specific showing of prejudice
is not required.4 31 One attorney representing codefendants, however, does
not violate constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel per

421. Id.
422. Id. at 267-68, 784 P.2d at 1010-11; see State v. Orona, 97 N.M. 232, 638 P.2d 1077

(1982);

State v. Talley, 103 N.M. 33, 702 P.2d 353 (Ct. App. 1985).
423. Newman, 109 N.M. at 267-68, 784 P.2d at 1010-11. •
424. Id. at 268, 784 P.2d at 1011.
425. Id. (citing State v. Dean, 105 N.M. 5, 727 P.2d 944 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104 N.M.
702, 726 P.2d 856 (1986)).
426. Id. In addition to requesting a cautionary instruction, Newman's attorney provided a vigorous
defense throughout the trial. Id.
427. Crislip, 109 N.M. at 356-58, 785 P.2d at 267-69.
428. Id. at 358, 785 P.2d at 269.
429. Newman, 109 N.M. at 268, 784 P.2d at 1011.
430. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481 (1978) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 70 (1942)). "[T]he 'assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates
that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer
shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests." Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70.
431. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489.
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conflicts of interest in
se.432 New Mexico courts previously addressed
433 and State v. Robinson.43 4
State v. Aguilar

In New Mexico, conflicts of interest must be "actual" and not merely
a possibility. 435 The test for determining actual conflicts of interest is
conflicting interests' that adversely
whether "counsel 'actively represented
43 6
affected his performance."
In State v. Santillanes,437 the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed

the issue of whether defendant Santillanes was denied effective assistance
of counsel when his counsel also represented Santillanes' brother on
charges stemming from the same incident. Santillanes and his brother
became involved in a fight with several persons. 438 As a result, three
440
49
persons were wounded. Both Santillanes and his brother were arrested.

Santillanes was charged with shooting one victim, and his brother was
charged with stabbing two victims. 441 Both men retained the same defense
counsel. 44 2 Defendant was tried and convicted of aggravated battery with

a deadly weapon. 43
At a motion hearing for a new trial, Santillanes' attorney stated that,
after trial, Santillanes' brother admitted to committing the crime of which
Santillanes had just been convicted. 4" Santillanes asserted that defense
counsel had not allowed him to testify during trial on his own behalf. 445
Defense counsel admitted that he purposely avoided calling Santillanes
as a witness in order to protect Santillanes' brother.44 In addition, two
witnesses testified at the motion hearing that Santillanes' brother had
admitted to firing the shot. 447
The court held that Santillanes was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel because his attorney had a conflict of interest
in representing both Santillanes and his codefendant brother for charges
emanating from the same incident. 448 The court stated that Santillanes'
attorney had a duty to avoid such conflicts of interest. 449 Furthermore,

there is a conflict of interest, prejudice to the defense
in a case where
4 50
is presumed.

432. Id. at 482. The Court points out that a "'common defense often gives strength against a
common attack."' Id. at 482-83 (quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 92).
433. 87 N.M. 503, 536 P.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1975).
434. 99 N.M. 674, 662 P.2d 1341, cert denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983).
435. State v. Santillanes, 109 N.M. 781, 790 P.2d 1062 (Ct. App. 1990).
436. Id. at 783, 790 P.2d at 1064.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 782, 790 P.2d at 1063.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 783, 790 P.2d at 1064.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 782, 790 P.2d at 1063.
449. Id. at 783, 790 P.2d at 1064 (citing State v. Talley, 103 N.M. 33, 702 P.2d 353 (Ct. App.
1985)).
450. Id. (citing State v. Aguilar, 87 N.M. 503, 536 P.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1975)). The court mentioned
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The court noted that trial counsel had to abandon a strategy that could
4 51
have absolved Santillanes in an attempt to exonerate Santillanes' brother.
Thus, the court held that an actual 45conflict
of interest existed and
2
Santillanes was entitled to a new trial.
D.

Motions for Continuance and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims
In State v. Brazeal,453 the court addressed the issue of whether the
denial of a motion for continuance creates the presumption that the
defendant suffered prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel.4 5 4 In
this case, a public defender was appointed to represent Brazeal on February
23, 1989, following a mistrial. 455 The day before trial, defense counsel
informed the court that additional investigation time was needed and,
therefore, he could not render effective assistance of counsel. 4 6 Defense
counsel then moved for a continuance on the day of the trial, but the
motion was denied. 457 On appeal, Brazeal claimed ineffective assistance
of counsel for several reasons, one of which was the denial of the
4

continuance. 11
The court noted that "the trial judge has broad discretion in ruling
on a motion for continuance. ' ' 459 Furthermore, only the most egregious
circumstances would support a presumption of ineffectiveness arising from
the denial of a continuance.
The court then held that, "except in
exceptional circumstances, [the court should] not ignore the actual conduct
of the trial and presume that the defendant has suffered prejudice from
ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure of the trial judge to
grant a continuance."'

46 1

that "there must be an actual conflict of interest and not just a possibility of a conflict." Id.
(citing State v. Robinson, 99 N.M. 674, 662 P.2d 1341, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983)). The
court mentioned that the "test for determining the existence of an actual conflict is whether counsel
'actively represented conflicting interests' that adversely affected his performance." Id. (citing Robinson, 99 N.M. at 679, 662 P.2d at 1346).
451. Id.
452. Id. at 785, 790 P.2d at 1066.
453. 109 N.M. 752, 790 P.2d 1033 (Ct. App. 1990).
454. Id. at 755, 790 P.2d at 1036.
455. Id. at 754, 790 P.2d at 1035.
456. Id. at 755, 790 P.2d at 1036.
457. Id.
458. Id. A denial of continuance often precludes the defense attorney from preparing fully and
properly. The court recognized that "[b]oth New Mexico and the United States Supreme Courts
have treated the claim of an improper denial of a continuance as a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel." Id. (citing State v. Taylor, 107 N.M. 66, 752 P.2d 781 (1988); United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648 (1984)).
459. Id. at 756, 790 P.2d at 1037.
460. Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648
(1984)). It appears that it would be difficult to demonstrate egregious circumstances to support a
presumption of ineffectiveness. "A presumption of ineffectiveness arising from refusal to grant a
continuance is justified in a very limited class of cases." Id.
461. Id. "[A]ppellate courts will not presume denial of effective assistance of counsel because of
the trial judge's refusal to grant a continuance unless, under the circumstances, 'the likelihood that
any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a
presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial."' Id.
(citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60).
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Because no presumption of prejudice existed, Brazeal had to establish

ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney's conduct at trial.462
The court found no proof of prejudice and held that Brazeal was not

denied effective assistance of counsel. 463 The court based this holding on
the determination that the outcome of the trial would likely have been
the same even if the continuance had been granted.4
IV.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Introduction
The fifth amendment Of the United States Constitution provides that
no person may be put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense

A.

twice. 465 In its interpretation of the double jeopardy clause, the United
States Supreme Court has found that double jeopardy protects against:

(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.4 During the survey period, New Mexico
courts only dealt with double jeopardy protection with respect to multiple
punishments for the same offense. 467
The Supreme Court has stated that the federal double jeopardy clause
applies to state prosecutions through the fourteenth amendment. 468 Adtwice put in
ditionally, New Mexico protects its citizens from being
69 and by statute. 470
constitution4
its
under
offense
same
the
for
jeopardy
The New Mexico constitutional provision has been interpreted to afford
the identical protection provided by the federal constitutional amendjeopardy, however, furment. 47' The statutory protection against double
472
ther defines New Mexico citizens' rights.

462. Id. at 757, 790 P.2d at 1038. The court first considered the prejudice element, rather than
first considering whether defense counsel's performance was deficient. Id. at 758, 790 P.2d at 1039.
"If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice
.... that course should be followed." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
466. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
467. State v. McGuire, 110 N.M. 304, 795 P.2d 996 (1990); State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 792
P.2d 408 (1990); State v. Corneau, 109 N.M. 81, 781 P.2d 1159 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Moore,
109 N.M. 119, 782 P.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Martinez, 109 N.M. 34, 781 P.2d 306 (Ct.
App. 1989).
468. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
469. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15.
470. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1984). The statute provides:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same crime. The defense of double
jeopardy may not be waived and may be raised by the accused at any stage of a
criminal prosecution, either before or after judgment. When the indictment, information or complaint charges different crimes or different degrees of the same
crime and a new trial is granted the accused, he may not be tried for a crime or
degree of the crime greater than the one of which he was originally convicted.
Id.
471. State v. Rogers, 90 N.M. 604, 605-06, 566 P.2d 1142, 1143-44, aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
90 N.M. 604, 566 P.2d 1142 (1977).
472. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
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A complete double jeopardy analysis requires a thorough understanding
of several complicated concepts. The first concept that will be discussed
concerns when jeopardy attaches for an offense. 473 Because the double
jeopardy clause prohibits a person from being twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense, a court must decide when the defendant is first put
in jeopardy. Of course, a determination that jeopardy has attached for
a given offense does not necessarily bar retrial under all circumstances.4 74
Thus, the next concept discussed concerns some of the situations in which
jeopardy attached but retrial was not barred.475
Another concept that leads to much confusion concerns whether the
defendant has previously been put in jeopardy for the offense with which
he is currently charged. This concept often requires an inquiry into whether
two separate statutory offenses are the "same offense" as the term is
used in the fifth amendment or any applicable corresponding state constitutional provision. 476 New Mexico
courts clarified several of these con477
cepts during the survey period.
B.

When Jeopardy Attaches
When faced with a double jeopardy challenge, the first question that
a court must often answer is: has this defendant already been put in
jeopardy, i.e., has jeopardy attached for the given offense? For the
purpose of determining when jeopardy attaches, the Supreme Court has
distinguished between criminal jury trials and criminal bench trials. In
a criminal jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and
sworn.4 78 In47 9a criminal bench trial, jeopardy attaches when evidence is
first heard.
In New Mexico, jeopardy attaches just as it does under federal double
jeopardy law. Jeopardy attaches under state law when the jury is impaneled
in a criminal jury trial, 480 and in a bench trial when the state presents
some evidence. 41'

473. See infra notes 478-81 and accompanying text.
474. The most common example of a permissible retrial occurs following an appellate order for
a remand. Although a new trial may be granted to the defendant, the second trial is a continuation
of the first for double jeopardy purposes. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
475. See infra notes 482-532 and accompanying text.
476. See infra notes 532-621 and accompanying text.
477. See State v. McGuire, 110 N.M. 304, 795 P.2d 996 (1990); State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76,
792 P.2d 408 (1990); County of Los Alamos v. Tapia, 109 N.M. 736, 790 P.2d 1017 (1990);
Callaway v. State, 109 N.M. 416, 785 P.2d 1035, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2603 (1990); March v.
State, 109 N.M. 110, 782 P.2d 82 (1989); State v. Haddenham, 110 N.M. 149, 793 P.2d 279, cert.
denied, 110 N.M. 72, 792 P.2d 49 (1990); State v. Post, 109 N.M. 177, 783 P.2d 487 (Ct. App.
1989); State v. Moore, 109 N.M. 119, 782 P.2d 91 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 54, 781
P.2d 782 (1989); State v. Martinez, 109 N.M. 34, 781 P.2d 306 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Barber,
108 N.M. 709, 778 P.2d 456 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 713, 778 P.2d 911 (1989); State
v. Eden, 108 N.M. 737, 743, 779 P.2d 114, 120 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 681, 777 P.2d
1325 (1989).
478. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
479. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
480. State v. Eden, 108 N.M. 737, 743, 779 P.2d 114, 120 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M.
713, 778 P.2d 1325 (1989) (citing State v. James, 93 N.M. 605, 603 P.2d 715 (1979)).
481. Id.
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C. When Double Jeopardy Does Not Bar Retrial
Even after jeopardy has attached, retrial is not barred under all circumstances. During the survey period, New Mexico courts considered
three situations in which defendants contended that double jeopardy barred
retrial after the trial court made a procedural error. 4 2 In one case, the
trial court declared a mistrial.4 83 In another case, the defendant's conviction
was supported by what appellate review later deemed inadmissible evidence. 4 4 In yet a third case, the defendant's dismissal was based on
erroneously excluded evidence.4 85 As the appellate courts pointed out, the
double jeopardy clause may bar retrial when the trial court declares a
mistrial, but double jeopardy does not bar retrial when the trial court
errs in its determination of the admissibility of evidence.
1. Mistrials
Although jeopardy has attached, judicial declaration of a mistrial over
the defendant's objection may not bar retrial. 4 6 The Supreme Court has
determined that if the defendant objects to a mistrial, retrial is barred
unless there existed a "manifest necessity" to
once jeopardy attaches
487
declare the mistrial.
The Court defined manifest necessity as a "high degree" of necessity.4 8
Mistrials are manifestly necessary when a procedural error prevents the
trial from going forward. 489 Additionally, declaring a mistrial is manifestly
necessary when there is a hung jury49° or consecutive illnesses of the
participants in a criminal proceeding. 9' Apparently, the state is entitled
to a "second shot" at a case after a mistrial has been declared when,
due to the circumstances of a given case, a fair trial is not possible.
Within the last year, the New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed double
jeopardy's impact on mistrials with respect to manifest necessity. In
Callaway v. State, 492 the trial court sua sponte declared a mistrial. Defense
counsel asked a legitimate question but received an unresponsive answer;
had the answer been solicited, it would have violated a court order.4 9943
The trial court judge declared a mistrial over defense counsel's objection.

482. County of Los Alamos v. Tapia, 109 N.M. 736, 790 P.2d 1017 (1990); Callaway v. State,
109 N.M. 416, 785 P.2d 1035, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2603 (1990); State v. Post, 109 N.M. 177,
783 P.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1989).
483. See Callaway, 109 N.M. at 416, 785 P.2d at 1035.
484. See Post, 109 N.M. at 178, 783 P.2d at 488.
485. See Tapia, 109 N.M. at 737, 790 P.2d at 1018.
486. See State v. Saavedra, 108 N.M. 38, 41, 766 P.2d 298, 301 (1989).
487. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); Saavedra, 108 N.M. at 41, 766
P.2d at 301.
488. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978).
489. See, e.g., Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916); Thompson v. United States, 155
U.S. 271 (1894).
490. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 579.
491. Saavedra, 108 N.M. at 41, 766 P.2d at 301.
492. 109 N.M. 416, 785 P.2d 1035 (1990).
493. Id. at 418, 785 P.2d at 1037.
494. Id.
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Additionally, the prosecution had not requested a mistrial at that time. 495
The supreme court found that the trial court acted out of anger and
did not explore other alternatives prior to declaring a mistrial. 496 The
Callaway court employed the rule set out by the West Virginia Supreme
Court in Porter v. Ferguson.497 The Porter court stated that "when the
trial court acts irrationally, irresponsibly or precipitately in response to
a prosecutor's motion for a mistrial, such action will not be condoned,
and double jeopardy will bar a retrial of the accused for the same
offense. ' 498 The Callaway court then stated that Porter's rule should
apply "even more forcefully when the trial court sua sponte orders a
mistrial. ' ' 499 The court concluded that because the mistrial was not manifestly necessary, the double jeopardy clause barred retrial.) ° Thus, in
New Mexico the state may not be entitled to a "second shot" at a case
when a trial court judge sua sponte declares a mistrial.5 0'
2. Convictions Supported by Erroneously Admitted Evidence
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the double
jeopardy clause does not bar retrial if the trial court based defendant's
conviction on evidence later deemed inadmissible.0 2 In Lockhart v. Nelson,
the trial court, during Johnny Lee Nelson's sentencing hearing, allowed
the prosecution to admit evidence that the United States District Court
of the Eastern District of Arkansas later deemed inadmissible. 0 3 The
district court then found that double jeopardy barred the state from
resentencing Nelson.5 04
The Supreme Court accepted the appellate court's finding that evidence
was erroneously admitted and thus the remaining evidence was insufficient
to support enhancing Nelson's sentence under Arkansas' habitual offender
statute.0 5 The Court still decided, however, that the double jeopardy
clause did not bar retrial.) 6 The Lockhart Court based its reasoning on
the decision that it was permitted to look at all the evidence presented,
50 7
not just the admissible evidence.
5
°
In State v. Post, the New Mexico Court of Appeals adopted the
United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Lockhart °9 The trial court

495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.

Id.
Id.
324 S.E.2d 397 (W. Va. 1984).
Callaway, 109 N.M. at 417, 785 P.2d at 1036 (quoting Porter, 324 S.E.2d at 401).
Id.
Id. at 417-18, 785 P.2d at 1036-37.
See id. at 416, 785 P.2d at 1035.
Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 40 n.7.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 41-42.
109 N.M. 177, 783 P.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 181, 783 P.2d at 491; see also Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 33.
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5 10
in Post admitted evidence the court of appeals later deemed inadmissible.
The court of appeals then held, citing Lockhart, that retrial is permissible
after an appellate court finds the trial court erroneously admitted evidence,
even if the remaining evidence would not support a conviction.5" The
Post court reasoned that if retrial was not allowed, the state would have
to "overtry" its cases in order to ensure that, even if some of the
admitted evidence was later excluded, there would still be sufficient
evidence to support a conviction.' 12 Although the Post court allowed a
retrial, it left open the question of whether the state could replace the
excluded evidence with new evidence during the second trial. 13

3. Dismissals Based on Erroneously Excluded Evidence
Later in the survey period, the New Mexico Supreme Court more
clearly explained when double jeopardy prohibits a trial after a district
51 4
court has dismissed a criminal case. In County of Los Alamos v. Tapia,
the supreme court distinguished between dismissals based on evidentiary
55
insufficiency and dismissals based on erroneously excluded evidence.
In Tapia, a police officer in Los Alamos County observed the defendant
running a stop sign.51 6 After the officer began to pursue defendant with
emergency flashers on, defendant drove over the county line into Santa
518
Fe County.5 1 7 Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The
trial judge found the arrest was illegal and excluded the fruits of the
arrest, including the results of the field sobriety test. 5t 9 The charges were
52
therefore dismissed.5 20 The county appealed the dismissal. ' The court
of appeals affirmed the dismissal on double jeopardy grounds.522
The supreme court held that double jeopardy did not bar further
prosecution because the trial court's dismissal was based on erroneously
excluded evidence and not on insufficient evidence.5 23 The Tapia court
' 5 24 is trial
explained that the "incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence
error and evidentiary insufficiency is the "failure of the prosecution to
offer sufficient evidence to satisfy the trier of fact beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3' ' 25 The court therefore found that double jeopardy does not
the defendant proves the trial court erroneously
preclude retrial when
526
admitted evidence.

510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.

Post, 109 N.M. at 178, 783 P.2d at 488.
Id.at 181, 783 P.2d at 491.
Id.
Id.
109 N.M. 736, 790 P.2d 1017 (1990).
Id. at 740, 790 P.2d at 1021 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978)).
Id. at 737-38, 790 P.2d at 1018-19.
Id. at 738, 790 P.2d at 1019.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 744, 790 P.2d at 1025.
Id. at 740, 790 P.2d at 1021 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978)).
Id.
Id.
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The Tapia court then supported its decision by relying on the trial
court's failure to render a judgment of acquittal.5 27 The court first distinguished between an acquittal, which it defined as a resolution of some
of the factual issues in the defendant's favor, and a termination of a
trial in defendant's favor.52 It then concluded that because the trial court
dismissed the case on "trial error" grounds and did not enter5 a29 judgment
of acquittal, the double jeopardy clause did not bar retrial.
The cases in this section show that double jeopardy does not protect
a defendant against retrial when a trial judge makes an error in judgment.
In such situations, appellate courts balance the fair administration of
justice against the defendant's fifth amendment rights.530 When a court
erroneously includes or excludes evidence, even the defendant may have
an interest in a retrial in order to have the matter fairly decided once
and for all.53 ' In such cases, the balance tips in favor of a final determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence via a new trial. But, the
balance tips in favor of barring retrial when the trial court acts out of
anger, rather than when it makes a simple error in judgment, and sua
sponte declares a mistrial when it was not manifestly necessary as exemplified by State v. Post.
D. "Same Offense" Doctrine
The main double jeopardy issue courts confront is whether the government has put a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense.
The same offense doctrine comes into play in two distinct situations.
The first situation occurs when a defendant has been given multiple
punishments for the same offense during a single trial. The second
situation occurs when a defendant faces two trials for one offense.
The Supreme Court has developed a test for courts to determine whether
two statutory offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes. The
first prong of the test, which is used in the analysis of both single trial
and multiple trial situations, determines whether the legislature intended
multiple punishments in a given case, and whether the two offenses are
the same for double jeopardy purposes. 3 2 The second prong of the test,
which need only be used in the case of a subsequent prosecution, shifts
the court's focus from statutory construction to the defendant's conduct
by prohibiting a second trial based on previously tried conduct. 33

527.
528.
529.
530.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 741, 790 P.2d at 1022.
at 741, 742, 790 P.2d at 1022, 1023.
at 743-44, 790 P.2d at 1024-25.
Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988); see also Tapia, 109 N.M. at 741-42, 790 P.2d

at 1022-23.
531. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 42. Apparently, Johnny Lee Nelson's "opportunity to 'obtai[n]
a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error' weighed heavily in the state's favor. Id. (quoting
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978)). According to Justice Rehnquist, a defendant may
have an interest in a retrial rather than a dismissal, thus this balancing test may start out tipped
in the state's favor. Id.
532. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
533. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
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During the survey period, New Mexico courts were only confronted
with cases in which defendants contended they were challenging multiple
punishments in a single prosecution.1"4 In these cases, our state courts
decided whether New Mexico's double jeopardy clause precludes multiple
punishment: (1) when legislative intent dictates imposing multiple punishments for several illegal acts perpetrated against a single victim; (2)
when legislative intent dictates imposing multiple punishments for several
illegal acts perpetrated against multiple victims; and (3) when public
policy, rather than clear legislative intent, may impose multiple punishments upon a defendant. Before turning to the recent New Mexico cases
dealing with the "same offense" doctrine, an understanding of the United
States Supreme Court's treatment of federal "same offense" jurisprudence
is in order.
The First Prong: Blockburger v. United States and Legislative
Intent
The Supreme Court developed a test to determine whether two offenses
are the same for double jeopardy purposes in Blockburger v. United
States.535 The Court stated "the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
53 6 The Supreme Court inproof of a fact which the other does not.
terpreted Blockburger as mandating a comparison of the statutory elements
of the two given offenses to determine whether it is possible to violate
537
one offense without violating the other. If it is possible to violate only
one of the offenses, then the two offenses are not the "same offense"
for double jeopardy purposes. 3 8
Statutory analysis under Blockburger does not require that two crimes
be exactly the same in order to be considered the same offense for double
jeopardy purposes. If one crime includes all of the elements of another
crime, punishment for the lesser included offense precludes prosecution
53 9 The Blockburger
of the greater offense via the double jeopardy clause.
Court therefore provided a test which focuses on the statutory elements
of two crimes to determine whether, for the purposes of double jeopardy
54°
analysis, the two crimes are the same offense and thus merge.
1.

The Second Prong: Grady v. Corbin-Multiple Trials and the
Shift in Focus to Conduct
The United States Supreme Court has recently determined that merely
comparing the statutory elements of the given offenses, as the Blockburger
2.

534. For a discussion of some recent New Mexico cases dealing with double jeopardy's impact
on multiple prosecutions, see Survey, Criminal Procedure, 20 N.M.L. Rev. 285, 309-10 (Spring
1990).
535. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
536. Id. at 304 (citations omitted).
110 S. Ct. 2084, 2090-91 (1990).
537. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, -,
538. Id.
- , 110 S. Ct. at 2090.
539. See, e.g., id. at

540. See id.
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test does, may be insufficient in some circumstances.5 4 In Grady v.
Corbin, 42 the defendant, Thomas Corbin, caused an automobile accident
in which the driver of the car he hit died. The metropolitan court judge,
unaware of the death, accepted Corbin's guilty plea to two misdemeanor
traffic violations.5 43 Later, the state indicted Corbin for vehicular manslaughter. 5 " The Supreme Court, in affirming the New York Court of
Appeals, barred the state from further prosecuting Corbin on double
jeopardy grounds.5 45 The Grady Court held that "the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element
of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove
conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already
been prosecuted."546
The Court explained that the Blockburger test is only the first step in
modern double jeopardy analysis.147 If the Blockburger test bars a subsequent prosecution, the analysis ends.5 " But when the criminal statutes
the state relies upon survive Blockburger's scrutiny, and the prosecution
must "prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant
has already been prosecuted," double jeopardy still bars a subsequent
prosecution. 549
The Court reasoned that multiple prosecutions raise more concerns
than do other situations under which double jeopardy is a consideration.55 °
Although single prosecutions, as well as multiple prosecutions, may subject
a defendant to enhanced sentencing, only multiple prosecutions give the
state an opportunity to practice its case and therefore increase the risk
of an erroneous conviction. 55' Because multiple trials subject defendants
to greater risks than do single trials, double jeopardy must afford greater
protection to defendants under the threat of multiple trials. 552 The Court
has therefore increased double jeopardy's protection by forbidding any
court from twice trying a defendant for the same conduct, rather than
simply for the same offense.
The Supreme Court has produced a two-prong test for purposes of a
"same offense" analysis. First, a court must determine if the legislature
clearly intended multiple punishments under the given statutes. 51 If the

541. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990); see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161, 166-67 n.6 (1977).
542. 495 U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
543. Id. at
, 110 S. Ct. at 2088.
544. Id. at
, 10 S. Ct. at 2089. The indictment charged Corbin with reckless manslaughter,
second-degree vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, third-degree reckless assault,
and driving while intoxicated. Id.
545. Id. at
, 110 S. Ct. at 2089-90.
546. Id. at
, 110 S. Ct at 2087 (emphasis added).
547. Id. at -,
110 S. Ct at 2090, 2093.
548. Id. at
, 10 S. Ct. at 2090 (citation omitted).
549. Id. at
,
110 S. Ct at 2093 (footnote omitted).
550. Id. at
,
10 S. Ct at 2091.
551. Id. at -,
110 S. Ct at 2091-92; see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
552. Grady, 495 U.S. at
, 110 S. Ct. at 2091-92.
553. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1980). A court is to begin with the
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legislature clearly intended to impose multiple punishments using the two
statutes, double jeopardy does not bar multiple punishments and the
court's job is done.1 4 Absent a finding of clear legislative intent, the
to determine
court must use Blockburger as a test of statutory construction
5" If it is not
statutes.
the
of
one
only
violate
to
whether it is possible
possible to commit one crime without committing the other, double
jeopardy precludes multiple punishments and, again, the court's job is
done.55 6 Finally, in the case of subsequent prosecutions, the court must
determine whether the prosecution will necessarily prove conduct for
55 7 If the prosecution will
which the defendant has already been tried.
prove the same conduct twice, double jeopardy bars the subsequent
prosecution.558
3. New Mexico's Treatment of the "Same Offense" Doctrine
The New Mexico Supreme Court implicitly adopted the Blockburger
test in Owens v. Abram.55 9 More recently, the court has clarified double
jeopardy analysis stating that "merger precludes an individual's conviction
of a greater
and sentence for a crime that is a lesser included offense
' ' 56° Further, the
charge upon which defendant has also been convicted.
court of appeals has stated that a comparison of the statutory elements
and in
of each offense is necessary in cases of subsequent prosecutions
61
cases of multiple punishments in a single prosecution.
assumption that the legislature did not intend to punish the same offense under two statutes. Id.
Simply finding that two statutes could punish the same act is not enough. See Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161 (1977). But where a legislature enacts a separate criminal statute that explicitly imposes
an additional punishment for enhanced criminal activity, the double jeopardy clause does not preclude
a court from imposing both sentences upon a defendant whose single act violates both statutes.
See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). For example, multiple punishments were not precluded
when a defendant violated Missouri's first degree robbery statute and its armed criminal action
statute because the Missouri Legislature clearly intended to impose multiple punishments upon
convicted felons who used weapons. See id. The Hunter Court quoted the relevant statute:
[A]ny person who commits any felony under the laws of this state by, with, or
through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon is also guilty
of the crime of armed criminal action and, upon conviction, shall be punished by
imprisonment by the division of corrections for a term of not less than three years.
The punishment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to any
punishment provided by law committed by, with or through the use, assistance, or
aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon....
Id. at 362 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.225 (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added)).
554. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69.
110 S. Ct. at 2090-91.
-,
555. See Grady, 495 U.S. at
556. See id.
110 S. Ct. at 2093.
-,
557. Id. at
558. Id.
559. 58 N.M. 682, 274 P.2d 630 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 (1955). The Owens court did
not cite Blockburger, but instead relied on In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943),
State v. Jacoby, 25 N.M. 224, 180 P. 462 (1919), and Bartlett v. United States, 166 F.2d 928 (10th
Cir. 1948) for its double jeopardy analysis.
560. State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 86, 792 P.2d 408, 418 (1990) (citation omitted).
561. State v. Moore, 109 N.M. 119, 782 P.2d 91 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 54, 781
P.2d 782 (1989). Under New Mexico law, one crime is a lesser included offense of another if the
elements of the greater offense include all of the elements of the lesser offense. State v. Wynne,
108 N.M. 134, 138, 767 P.2d 373, 377 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354
(1989) (citation omitted).
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When Legislative Intent Dictated Imposing Multiple Punishments

for Several Illegal Acts Perpetrated Against a Single Victim
In its first double jeopardy case after Grady, the New Mexico Supreme
Court determined whether a jury could have found separate facts to
support multiple convictions in a single prosecution without violating the
defendant's double jeopardy rights. In State v. McGuire, 62 the court
affirmed defendant's convictions of first-degree murder, first-degree kid-

napping, and second-degree criminal sexual penetration

("CSP").63

The

defendant's main contention on appeal was that the state's use of defendant's same acts to support a conviction of CSP and kidnapping
violated his double jeopardy rights.5 64
The court first explained that, barring a clear legislative intent to the
contrary, the imposition of multiple punishments violates double jeop-

ardy . 65 The court then searched for an indication of legislative intent
within the CSP and kidnapping statutes. 566 The court reasoned the legislature clearly intended for a defendant to be punished for both CSP
and kidnapping, if found guilty of both offenses, because the legislature
wrote two statutes, each imposing a separate punishment for a single act

of rape.5 67 Recognizing that the state's reliance on "identical facts" to
support both convictions would be troublesome, the court found the trial

court did not violate the defendant's double jeopardy rights because the
jury could have relied on separate facts to infer that the defendant had
the requisite intent for both CSP and kidnapping.56
The problem with the court's analysis is that the McGuire rule completely undermines the Blockburger test. The court recognized that two
offenses merge for double jeopardy purposes "if the defendant could
not have committed the greater offense without also committing the
5 69

lesser.
The court pointed out, however, that in New Mexico, "[g]iven
the statutory definitions, it is possible that nearly every act of [CSPI

562. 110 N.M. 304, 795 P.2d 996 (1990). This was the culmination of a highly publicized case
in New Mexico. The incident began when defendant, Travis McGuire, kidnapped Jena Marie Repp
in Albuquerque on December 6, 1985. Id. at 306, 795 P.2d at 998.
563. Id. at 309, 795 P.2d at 1001. The court also reversed and remanded the case for a new
sentencing hearing. Id. at 314, 795 P.2d at 1006.
564. Id. at 307, 795 P.2d at 999.
565. Id. at 308, 795 P.2d at 1000. (citing State v. (Christopher) Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 792 P.2d
408 (1990); United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1582 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
- U.S. __,
110 S. Ct. 3237 (1990)); see also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 697
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
566. McGuire, 110 N.M. at 308, 795 P.2d at 1000.
567. Id. at 309-10, 795 P.2d at 1001-02. As defined in New Mexico, kidnapping requires that
the victim be "held to service against [her) will." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-4-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
This "service" can include holding for sexual purposes. State v. Hutchinson, 99 N.M. 616, 624,
661 P.2d 1315, 1323 (1984). Additionally, New Mexico does not require a kidnapping to include
transportation of the victim, contrary to the common law. McGuire, 110 N.M. at 308, 795 P.2d
at 1000. Thus, most rapes will also be kidnappings. Id.
568. McGuire, 110 N.M. at 308-09, 795 P.2d at 1000-01. In order to be convicted of kidnapping,
the state must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to restrain the victim. A conviction
of CSP, on the other hand, need only be supported by general intent. See id. at 309, 795 P.2d
at 1001.
569. Id. at 309, 795 P.2d at 1001 (citing State v. DeMary, 99 N.M. 177, 655 P.2d 1021 (1982)).
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5 70 Instead of concluding that
also will constitute the act of kidnapping.
CSP and kidnapping merged, the court found that the statutory schemes
of CSP and kidnapping constituted clear legislative intent to impose
57
multiple punishments upon someone convicted of second-degree CSP. '
Applying the McGuire rule completely precludes the merger of any two
offenses.
determining whether
The court continued its double jeopardy analysis by
5 72 The court looked
kidnapping.
of
offense
included
lesser
a
CSP was
at the given elements of each crime but disregarded its earlier finding
that "nearly every act of [CSP] also will constitute the act of kidnapping. 5 73 Instead, the court again relied on 4the fact that CSP and kid57
Finding that "substantial
napping have different requisite intents.
the defendant of each
convict
independently
to
present
was
evidence"
75
convictions.
McGuire's
affirmed
court
the
charge,
The second portion of the court's analysis is superfluous. The court
had already decided that the legislature clearly intended that multiple
punishments be imposed when a defendant is convicted of second-degree
if the
CSP and kidnapping.5 76 There is no double jeopardy problem
77 Once the
legislature clearly intended to impose multiple punishments.
court found clear legislative intent to impose multiple punishments upon
CSP and kidnapping convictions, its analysis should have ended.
The opinion goes on to further convolute double jeopardy law. The
court, in concluding that double jeopardy did not preclude multiple
punishments imposed upon this defendant, reasoned that each conviction
was based on independent "substantial evidence.' '578 The court then cited
Grady v. Corbin7 9 to explain that the United States Supreme Court
considers the "critical inquiry [to] involve[] the conduct to be proven,
80
not the evidence used to prove it." By upholding McGuire's convictions
because each was based on independent evidence, and then citing a
Supreme Court decision that requires an analysis of conduct rather than
evidence, the court has contradicted its own analysis.
Although the supreme court explained that the legislature intended
multiple punishments for a person convicted of kidnapping and CSP in
McGuire, the court also gave an example of when the legislature did
not intend to impose multiple punishments upon a person who committed

570. Id. at 308, 795 P.2d at 1000.
571. Id. at 308-09, 795 P.2d at 1000-01.
572. Id. at 309, 795 P.2d at 1001.
573. Id. at 308, 795 P.2d at 1000.
574. Id. at 308-09, 795 P.2d at 1000-01.
575. Id. at 309, 795 P.2d at 1001.
576. Id. at 310, 795 P.2d at 1002.
577. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983); see also Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684, 697 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
578. McGuire, 110 N.M. at 309, 795 P.2d at 1001.
579. 495 U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
580. McGuire, 110 N.M. at 310-11, 795 P.2d at 1002-03 (emphasis added) (citing Grady, 495
U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084).
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several acts of child abuse. In State v. Pierce58 the defendant was convicted
of fourteen counts of child abuse resulting in death or great bodily
harm.51 2 There was one victim in all of these offenses. All injuries were
inflicted during three separate episodes." 3 The state alleged a separate
count of child abuse for each injury inflicted. 584
The underlying problem with the Pierce case is obvious: the state's
charging scheme eventually led to a double jeopardy violation. Although
a defendant can be charged with offenses that eventually merge, entry
of multiple sentences after conviction is what violates the double jeopardy
clause. 85 The fourteen counts of child abuse merged into two separate
counts because the legislature did not intend, in the wording of the child
abuse statutes, for a defendant to be subject to multiple punishments
for a single act of child abuse. 58 6 The court found that Pierce only
committed two acts of abuse and thus vacated twelve of Pierce's convictions and sentences for child abuse. 58 7
The Pierce court, quoting the United States Supreme Court in Whalen
v. United States,588 as it did in State v. Ellenberger,519 found that the
double jeopardy clause only bars multiple punishments for the same
offense if the legislature did not intend a person convicted of multiple
offenses to be subject to multiple punishment. 590 The court interpreted
what evidence was necessary to support a conviction under the statute
criminalizing child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm and
fourth degree child abuse.5 9' The court held that multiple convictions are
allowed "only when each conviction is supported by evidence indicating
that: (1) a single abusive act or a continuous series of abusive acts was
interrupted and then another act or series was commenced, and (2) each
separate act or series of acts was accompanied by the requisite unlawful
conduct.' '592 The court then found the state did not show that each injury
was the result of an independent, interrupted act.5 93 Accordingly, the
court held that the double jeopardy clause barred multiple punishments

581. 110 N.M. 76, 792 P.2d 408 (1990).
582. Id. at 78, 792 P.2d at 410. Pierce was also convicted of first-degree murder, three counts
of first-degree criminal sexual penetration of a minor, one count of third-degree criminal sexual
contact of a minor, and two counts of fourth-degree child abuse. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
30-2-1, 30-9-11(A)(l), -13(A), and 30-6-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
583. Pierce, 110 N.M. at 78, 792 P.2d at 410.
584. Id. at 79, 792 P.2d at 411.
585. Id. at 86-87, 792 P.2d at 418-19. The court went on to find that entry of multiple sentences
is prohibited even where the sentences are to run concurrently. Id. at 87, 792 P.2d at 419.
586. Id. at 84-85, 792 P.2d at 416-17.
587. Id. at 87, 792 P.2d at 419.
588. 445 U.S. 684 (1980). "The only function the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases challenging
multiple punishments is to prevent the prosecutor from bringing more charges, and the sentencing
court from imposing greater punishments, than the Legislative Branch intended." Id. at 697 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
589. 96 N.M. 287, 629 P.2d 1216 (1981).
590. Pierce, 110 N.M. at 84-85, 792 P.2d at 416-17.
591. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
592. Pierce, 110 N.M. at 86, 792 P.2d at 418 (emphasis omitted).
593. Id.

Summer 1991]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

for the multiple injuries inflicted in this case and thus merged several
of the injuries into single acts of abuse."
The most significant portion of the opinion may be within the first
few sentences of the court's analysis. The court interpreted the double
jeopardy clause as prohibiting multiple punishments for a single act rather
than only for a single offense.5 95 The Pierce court stated that, "[bloth
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and article II,
the imposition of
section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution preclude
5 9 By expanding the defoffense."
or
act
one
for
multiple punishments
inition of the word "offense," as used in the double jeopardy clause,
to include acts, the court may be reflecting the United States Supreme
jeopardy analysis from the "same
Court's shift in emphasis in its double
5 97
conduct.1
"same
the
to
offense" 1
When Legislative Intent Dictated Imposing Multiple Punishments
for Several Illegal Acts Perpetrated Against Multiple Victims
9g
separate
The New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Moore defined
5 9 In Moore,
acts.
of
offenses by the number of victims and the number
the defendant, in the course of robbing the two victims' home, bound
both victims.6w The defendant was convicted of two counts of armed
61
robbery and two counts of false imprisonment. 0
First, the court looked at the statutory elements of armed robbery and
not merge. 60 2
false imprisonment and found that the two offenses did
The court's analysis of the two distinct offenses was consistent with
Blockburger. Next, the court determined that because there were two
offenses of armed
victims, the defendant committed four offenses: two
03
court reasoned
The
.
robbery and two offenses of false imprisonment
the double
committed,
were
that because four separate criminal acts
counts
two
for
punishments
jeopardy clause did not preclude multiple
of each offense.60
The Moore decision is consistent with the analysis followed by the
Pierce court. In its double jeopardy analysis, the Moore court first used
a "Blockburger-type" test to guide it through the necessary statutory
construction.60 The Moore court then determined the number of criminal
b.

594. Id. at 87, 792 P.2d at 419.
595. Id. at 85, 792 P.2d at 417.
596. Id. (emphasis added).
597. Cf. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990); see also supra text accompanying
notes 541-58.
598. 109 N.M. 119, 782 P.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1989).
599. Id. at 127-28, 782 P.2d at 99-100.
600. Id. at 122, 782 P.2d at 94.
601. Id. at 123, 782 P.2d at 95. Defendant was also convicted of one count of aggravated
burglary. Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16-4, -2, 30-4-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1984), 31-18-16 (Repl.
Pamp. 1990).
602. Moore, 109 N.M. at 127, 782 P.2d at 99.
603. Id. at 128, 782 P.2d at 100.
604. Id. at 127, 782 P.2d at 99.
605. Id.
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acts perpetrated by the defendant, as did the Pierce court. 6°6 Each court
then allowed only one punishment to be imposed for each unlawful act. 6 7
c.

When Public Policy, Rather Than Clear Legislative Intent, May
Impose Multiple Punishments Upon a Defendant
The court of appeals in State v. Martinez608 determined legislative intent
by looking at public policy when it considered whether multiple punishments for a single act were permissible.
The defendant in Martinez
was convicted of three counts of assisting the escape of inmates. 610
Martinez helped three escapees remain hidden from authorities by driving
them from Santa Fe to Albuquerque and later driving two of them to
Garden Grove, California. 61' In his appeal, Martinez contended the three
counts of assisting escape constituted the same offense for double jeopardy

purposes .612

The Martinez court began its inquiry by analogizing the facts in State

v. Smith613 with the facts before

it.

61

4

In Smith, law enforcement officials

confiscated four separate types of illegal drugs. 615 The Smith court found
that because its defendant was in possession of four different kinds of
drugs, in separate bags, the "same evidence rule does not bar prosecution
on each of the drug counts" and neither public policy nor legislative
intent indicate a desire to allow the four counts of drug trafficking to
merge.

61 6

The Martinez court therefore decided that four separate bags of drugs
was substantially similar to aiding the escape of three inmates in two
ways. 61 7 First, the Martinez court found similar public policies behind
criminalizing drug trafficking and assisting escape. 618 The court concluded
that because public policy precluded four counts of drug trafficking from
merging into one count, the same public policy would not allow three
counts of assisting escape to merge. 61 9 Second, the Martinez court decided
that if four counts of drug trafficking did not merge under the same
evidence rule, neither did three counts of assisting escape. 620 But the
Smith decision is distinct because it explained that double jeopardy did

606. Id. at 128, 782 P.2d at 100; Pierce, 110 N.M. at 85, 792 P.2d at 417.
607. Moore, 109 N.M. at 128, 782 P.2d at 100; Pierce, 110 N.M. at 86-87, 792 P.2d at 418-

19.
608. 109 N.M. 34, 781 P.2d 306 (Ct. App. 1989).

609. Id. at 38-39, 781 P.2d at 310-11.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.

Id. at 34, 781 P.2d at 306; see also
Martinez, 109 N.M. at 35, 781 P.2d
Id. at 38, 781 P.2d at 310.
94 N.M. 379, 610 P.2d 1208 (1980).
Martinez, 109 N.M. at 39, 781 P.2d
Smith, 94 N.M. at 380, 610 P.2d at
Id. at 381, 610 P.2d at 1210. Many

N.M. STAT. ANN.
at 307.

§ 30-22-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).

at 311.
1209.
analysts of double jeopardy equate the Blockburger

test with a "same evidence" test. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508,
2093 n.12 (1990).
617. Martinez, 109 N.M. at 39, 781 P.2d at 311.
618. Id.
619. Id.

620. Id.

-

n.12, 110 S. Ct. 2084,

Summer 1991]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

not require merger of the drug charges because each bag of drugs could
be used as separate evidence.6 2 1 The defendant's act of driving the escapees
in Martinez could not be separated, however, and the same evidence to
convict Martinez of one count of assisting escape would have to be used
to convict him of the other counts.
The Martinez court therefore failed to follow standard double jeopardy
law in two ways. First, it added an element of public policy to double
jeopardy analysis where none belongs. Second, the court of appeals
misapplied the Smith holding and upheld multiple punishments for a
single act that resulted in multiple offenses by disregarding the Blockburger
same evidence test.
The JurisdictionalException
Even if a person is convicted of a lesser included offense, a "jurisdictional exception" may allow a subsequent prosecution for a greater
offense. 622 If the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to try the defendant
for the greater offense at the time of the trial for the lesser included
offense, the jurisdictional exception allows a subsequent prosecution for
623
the greater offense in a court that has jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional exception may no longer be valid in New Mexico.
The supreme court adopted the jurisdictional exception in State v. Goodson.6 24 Although the United States Supreme Court has impliedly rejected
625
the jurisdictional exception several times, New Mexico courts have not
62 6
In Salaz v. Tansy,627 the United
read any of those cases as doing SO.
6
States District Court overruled the jurisdictional exception in New Mexico. 1
E.

Additional Sentencing Concerns
Double jeopardy violations often arise when a state attempts to enhance
an inmate's sentence under a habitual offender statute after initial sentencing. 629 New Mexico courts have stated that where retrial for sentence
63 0 sentence encorrection does not normally violate double jeopardy,
hancement may violate double jeopardy standards if it is not "within
objectively reasonable expectations of finality.' '631
In March v. State,63 2 the supreme court stated that a sentence may be
enhanced after the defendant begins serving the time, but not after he
F.

621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.

Id.
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 449 (1912).
Id.
54 N.M. 184, 188, 217 P.2d 262, 264 (1950).
See, e.g., Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
See Salaz v. Tansy, 730 F. Supp. 369 (D.N.M. 1989).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., March v. State, 109 N.M. 110, 782 P.2d 82 (1989).
State v. Barber, 108 N.M. 709, 711, 778 P.2d 456, 458 (Ct. App. 1989).
March, 109 N.M. at 111, 782 P.2d at 83.
109 N.M. 110, 782 P.2d 82 (1989).
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has been discharged from custody. 633 In March, the state attempted to
enhance a defendant's sentence after the sentence had already been served. 634
The March court stated that "[s]entencing may violate concepts of double
jeopardy if not within objectively reasonable expectations of finality. ' 635
The court reasoned that not only does a court lose jurisdiction to enhance
after a defendant is released, 6 6 but the reasonable person could infer
that he had completed his sentence upon release. 63 7 March finished serving
his sentence before the state filed its petition to enhance his sentence,
so the supreme court reversed the court of appeals. 68
The court of appeals encountered another example of impermissible
sentence enhancement in State v. Haddenham.6 9 The Haddenham court
held that double jeopardy prohibits sentencing a defendant as a habitual
offender using the same facts relied upon to convict the defendant of
the underlying offense of felon in possession of a firearm.
The prosecution in Haddenham used the same prior convictions in
order to enhance the defendants' sentences under the habitual offender
statute and to prove that each defendant was a felon for purposes of
the felon in possession of a firearm statute.6' The court reasoned that
because the legislature did not specifically intend to permit "double use"
of the same felony, the double jeopardy clause prohibited multiple pun2
ishments under those two statutes.6
MICHAEL J. DEKLEVA
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633. Id. at 112, 782 P.2d at 84.
634. Id.
635. Id.at 111, 782 P.2d at 83.
636. Id. at 112, 782 P.2d at 84.
637. Id. at 111, 782 P.2d at 83.
638. Id. at 112, 782 P.2d at 84. Consider whether the state would have violated March's "objectively
reasonable expectation of finality" had the state filed its petition for enhancement before March
was released, but the court still decided to enhance his sentence after his release. Id. at 111, 782
P.2d at 83. The court of appeals answered affirmatively in State v. Gaddy, 110 N.M. 120, 792
P.2d 1163 (Ct. App. 1990).
639. 110 N.M. 149, 793 P.2d 279, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 72, 792 P.2d 49 (1990). The court of

appeals consolidated Haddenham with State v. Benton.
640. Id. at 154, 793 P.2d at 284.
641. Id. at 151, 793 P.2d at 281; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-7-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1984), 3118-17 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
642. Haddenham, 110 N.M. at 153-54, 793 P.2d at 283-84; see Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684 (1980); State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 792 P.2d 408 (1990).

